Abstract
I defend the claim that physicalism is not committed to the view that non-phenomenal macrophysical truths are a priori entailed by the conjunction of microphysical truths (P), basic indexical facts (I), and a 'that's all' claim (T). I do so by showing that Chalmers and Jackson's most popular and influential argument in support of the claim that PIT ⊃ M is a priori, where 'M' stands for any ordinary, non-phenomenal, macroscopic truth, falls short of establishing its conclusion. My objection to Chalmers and Jackson's argument takes the form of a nested dilemma. Let 'Conceptual Competence Principle (CCP)' stand for the following claim: for any complete microphysical description D of a world w, a subject who is in possession of and competent with a macrophysical concept C is capable of determining a priori the extension of C. Either Jackson and Chalmers accept CCP or not. If the latter, then they cannot demonstrate that the conditional PIT ⊃ M is a priori. If the former, then they have a choice: they can either cite reasons that support the principle or argue that the principle should be taken for granted since it is entailed by the very notion of conceptual competence. But both alternatives are problematic. In regard to the first horn of this latter dilemma, I show not only that there are no good reasons to support the principle, but that there are also reasons to reject it. In regard to the second horn, I show that it cannot be the case that CCP is part of the very notion of conceptual competence. The conceptual capacity expressed by CCP requires that certain bridge principles or conditionals, which link the microphysical level to the macroscopic level, are either implicitly or explicitly given to the subject. But, as I argue, Chalmers and Jackson have no way of accounting for these bridge principles or conditionals in a manner that does not trivialize their position.
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Notes
A bit more explicitly, ‘P’ stands for all physical facts and laws expressed in the fundamental microphysical vocabulary of a true and complete physical theory; ‘Q’ stands for all truths about states of phenomenal consciousness; ‘I’ stands for basic indexical information such as, ‘I am here’ and ‘It is now;’ ‘T’ stands for a ‘that’s all’ claim stating that the laws and physical facts found in P and the phenomenal truths specified in Q provide the full description of the world.
A typical response to epistemic arguments against physicalism – i.e., arguments that purport to conclude an ontological gap between P and Q from an epistemic gap between P and Q (see Chalmers 1996) – is to deny that an epistemic gap leads to an ontological gap. But physicalists who do so are hard-pressed to explain why phenomenal facts alone are exempted from being a priori entailed by microphysical facts. This obstacle is not insurmountable, and a popular way around it is to maintain that an epistemic gap between P and Q is mandated by the nature of phenomenal concepts. This response is also known as ‘the phenomenal concept strategy.’ The strategy holds that the epistemic gap between P and Q is a consequence of the fact that phenomenal concepts are conceptually isolated from physical or functional concepts. Conceptual dualism of this sort eschews ontological dualism, for the uniqueness of consciousness (i.e., the fact that Q is not a priori entailed by P) is due to the special nature of the concepts that we use to describe our conscious states. On such an account, there is really nothing special about the ontological make-up of consciousness, but only about the way we conceive of it (see, e.g., Loar 1997 and Elpidorou 2013). Now, if PIT ⊃ M turns out not to be a priori, then there are additional reasons to be skeptical of arguments that reach ontological conclusions from epistemic premises: even though there is an epistemic gap between PIT and M, there is, arguably, no ontological gap.
A priori physicalism holds that all truths (modulo, perhaps, certain metaphysical or mathematical truths) are a priori entailed by PTI. A posteriori physicalism denies such a thesis concerning a priori entailment. Instead, it holds that all truths are metaphysically, but not also epistemically, necessitated by physical truths.
I should be quick to point out that Chalmers and Jackson are not committed to the conditional claim that ‘if PQIT ⊃ M is a priori, then PIT ⊃ M is a priori.’ Rather, they hold that if physicalism is true and PQIT ⊃ M is a priori, then we should conclude that PIT ⊃ M is a priori. That is because, according to Chalmers and Jackson, we have good reasons to think that physicalism is committed to the claim that the conditional PIT ⊃ Q is a priori. Hence, if physicalism is true and both conditionals (PQIT ⊃ M and PIT ⊃ Q) are a priori, then PIT ⊃ M is also a priori. It is clear then that PIT ⊃ M can be a priori only if PQIT ⊃ M is a priori. My aim in this article is to undermine Chalmers and Jackson’s argument in support of the conclusion that physicalism is committed to the claim that PIT ⊃ M is a priori by arguing against the claim that PQIT ⊃ M is a priori.
It has been argued that ‘a prioritude does not survive disquotation:’ so while the sentence (2b) is a priori the proposition expressed by (2b) is not (Lycan 2008: 76; Blackburn 2008). In this article, I grant that the proposition expressed by (2b) is a priori and focus on whether (2a) is entailed a priori by PQTI. Among other things, Block and Stalnaker (1999) also examine this question. Since Chalmers and Jackson (2001) is meant to be, partly at least, a response to Block and Stalnaker’s position, I will not discuss Block and Stalnaker’s views and arguments here. Suffice it to say that my position remains unaffected even if one accepts Chalmers and Jackson’s response. For an additional objection against the view that (2b) is a priori entailed by PQTI, see Tye (2009).
Although I have framed this thesis in terms of concepts and concept possession, it also applies for sentences and understanding: if a subject understands a sentence R, and if sufficient contextual information is given, then the subject is in a position to determine R’s extension.
Following Wimsatt (1976 and 1994), organizational levels are understood as compositional levels of organization, that is, ‘hierarchical divisions of stuff…organized by part-whole relations, in which wholes at one level function as parts at the next (and at higher) levels’ (Wimsatt 1994: 222). Wimsatt also suggests that these organizational levels ‘are a deep, non-arbitrary, and extremely important feature of the ontological architecture of our natural world’ (Wimsatt 1994: 225). Be that last point as it may, what is relevant for our purposes is that for each organizational level there is a level-specific vocabulary that can be used to describe entities belonging to that level. To give an example, subatomic particles belong to a different level than molecules, and molecules belong to a different level than chairs and stones.
Another way of stating the implicit/explicit distinction is the following. A bridge principle b is given explicitly to a subject S, if S either knows that b or that b is part of the anteceedent of the conditional PQTI ⊃ M. A bridge principle b is given implicitly to a subject S, if S is able to deduce a priori certain b-related ordinary macrophysical facts when the subject is provided with a complete microphysical description of the world.
A similar point has been recently and forcefully made by Diaz-Leon (2011). In the concluding section of this article, I discuss the ways in which my position differs from Diaz-Leon’s.
This is a variation of an example found in Stoljar (2005).
Chalmers and Jackson could claim that the fact that their view is trivially true does not amount to an objection. To argue for this conclusion, however, they must show that the requisite empirical information that allows the subject to perform the deduction plays only an enabling role and not a justifying role. As I argued in this subsection, if the relevant empirical information is known explicitly by the subject, then we have good reasons to think that the information plays a justifying role. In response, Chalmers and Jackson could argue that subjects who are competent with macrophysical concepts do not have explicit knowledge of those bridge principle and yet they can deduce them a priori from PQTI. In Sect. 4, I consider and argue against such a response.
Otherwise stated: Is there enough information contained in P that allows you to deduce that when you ‘see’ particles you are at lower-level than when you ‘see’ molecules? How do you know that you have ‘zoomed in’ or ‘zoomed out’? Or even more pressingly, how do you even go about ‘zooming out’ from the microphysical level to the macrophysical level? To know that what you ‘see’ is a molecule you need to know that a certain constellation of particles constitutes a system. You also need to know that such-and-such system with such-and-so properties constitutes a molecule. But to know that a constellation of particles constitutes a system or an object, you need to be given certain micro–macro structural principles. (Indexical information only tells you where in the world you are, it does not tell you how ‘deep’ you are). Without those principles, I do not see a way of deducing a priori the existence of systems—let alone atoms or molecules.
Chalmers (2012) argues that such microstructural or compositional claims are either a priori or a priori entailed by PQTI. He writes: '…there are questions about just what count as objects. These questions are in effect addressed in the discussion of ontology earlier. Whether we assume a liberal or a restricted view of objects, it is plausible that truths about the existence of macrophysical objects will follow from microphysical truths along with certain principles of composition for macroscopic objects. On my own view, these principles will themselves either be a priori or scrutable from [PQTI]' (291; emphasis added). But what is the evidence that Chalmers offers in support of his position? If we look to his discussion of ontological truths, Chalmers notes that earlier considerations (i.e., ones found in chapter 3) suggest 'that insofar as positive ontological truths are knowable at all (even if they are knowable only a posteriori), they are conditionally and a priori scrutable from a limited base such as [P#QI]' (268). (‘P#’ is my notation not Chalmers’.) It is crucial to note that P# differs from P insofar as the former includes, in addition to microphysical truths, macrophysical truths – i.e., 'truths about any entities, including macroscopic entities, in the language of classical physics' – and 'any other statements of lawful regularities and counterfactual dependence among microphysical and macrophysical truths' (110). But by assuming P# in the antecedent of the conditional, Chalmers grants that the subject can already perform step (a). For instance, he explicitly states that P#QTI includes macrophysical truths such as ‘There exists an object of such-and-such shape and size at such-and-such location’ (ibid.). Therefore, even if Chalmers’ (2012: chapter 3) arguments are successful in showing that ordinary macroscopic truths are a priori entailed by P#QTI, they do not show – at least, by themselves – that such truths are a priori entailed by a more limited base, i.e., PQTI.
Perhaps, Chalmers would hold that the a priori status of the structural or compositional principles in question is underwritten by the acceptance of certain meta-ontological views. As he notes, 'we might accept a "lightweight" realist view of ontology on which existence claims can be analytic, a rationalist view on which basic ontological principles are a priori,' or even ‘an anti-realist view on which there are no ontological truths at all’ (268). A lightweight realist view should be contrasted to a 'heavyweight realist' view of ontology, which holds that answers to ontological questions are neither trivial nor analytic. For example, whereas the lightweight realist holds that conditionals of the sort, ‘if particles are arranged objectwise, then there is an object,' are analytic; the heavyweight realist denies that the consequent trivially or analytically follows from the antecedent. (For more on lightweight realism, heavyweight realism, and ontological anti-realism, see Chalmers 2009). Indeed, there can be heavyweight realist views according to which ontological claims are not knowable or cannot be known conclusively. On such heavyweight views there will be ontological claims that are neither known a priori nor a priori entailed by PQTI.
Here is not the place to take up the rather difficult and complex issue of adjudicating between differing meta-ontological positions. Suffice it to say that if Chalmers' thesis that macroscopic truths are a priori entailed by PQTI requires that certain structural or compositional truths can be known a priori and this latter claim depends on the acceptance (or rejection) of certain meta-ontological positions, then Chalmers' thesis also depends on the acceptance (or rejection) of such positions. That is to say, whatever controversy surrounds the meta-ontological position (or positions) on which such compositional truths turn out to be a priori also surrounds Chalmers' entailment thesis. But even if we accept that the following conditional is a priori: 'if particles are arranged objectwise, then there is an object;' the subject still needs to know what it means for particles to be arranged objectwise. In other words, in order to be in a position to use the conditional 'if particles are arranged objectwise, there is an object' one needs to know already that if particles are arranged thus-and-so, then particles are arranged objectwise. Thus, even if the first conditional were assumed to be a priori, Chalmers still needs to argue that the second conditional is also a priori or contained in P. But no argument in support of this latter claim is provided.
Finally, suppose for the sake of the argument that conditionals of the sort 'if particles are arranged objectwise, then there is an object' are a priori. Furthermore, suppose that P includes a description of what it means for particles to be arranged objectwise. Would such a double admission vindicate Chalmers' (and Jackson's) position? I do not think so. By incorporating into P a description of what it means for particles to be arranged objectwise we are explicitly granting the subject knowledge of certain structural claims regarding macrophysical objects. But shouldn’t such claims be a priori entailed by the subject? Aren’t those truths macrophysical in an important sense? After all, doesn’t knowledge of such truths specify the nature of those (macrophysical) objects? If so, then Chalmers and Jackson cannot assume knowledge of those structural claims in their attempt to argue that all macrophysical truths are a priori entailed by PQTI.
My conclusions also apply to Jackson (2007: 190)’s argument in support of the a priori entailment of psychological facts from physical facts. He writes: ‘Our very understanding of, for example, the sentence “x believes that snow is white” tells us how things have to be if that sentence is to be true, but that “how things have to be” had better be physical if physicalism is to be true. But then the passage from the physical to descriptions of how things are in psychological terms is accessible from understanding alone. That’s tantamount to a priori physicalism understood de dicto.’ The idea here is that if physicalism is true then the way things are is completely determined by the way things are physically. Hence, if we know P (or PTI) we should know how things are. Hence, the passage from the physical to the psychological should be a priori.
Jackson’s argument is susceptible to a variation of the same objection that I launched against Chalmers and Jackson’s (2001) position. It is of course true that, if physicalism is true, the way things are physically determines the way things are psychologically. But in order for this determination to take the form of a priori entailment, one needs to assume that a subject can move a priori from a physical description of the world to a psychological description of the world. As I have been arguing throughout the article, there are no reasons to accept that a subject can do so a priori. Even if we accept Jackson’s claim that in order to grasp everyday macro-predicates we have to know their (true) application-conditions, it does not follow from this that we must know their application conditions in physical (not to say, molecular or microphysical) terms.
I am indebted to Alex Byrne for a very helpful discussion on the issues addressed in this section. I should point out that Chalmers and Jackson (2001) are ambivalent regarding whether the requisite microstructural information should be either a priori deducible from P or part of P. In the paragraph spanning 330–1, they state explicitly that such information in implied by P. In note 10, however, they allow this information to be part of P. Regardless of which view we take to be their official view, their position runs into trouble. If it is the former view (i.e., the view that the requisite information should be a priori deducible from P) that corresponds to Chalmers and Jackson’s official view, then they need to show how such information can be deduced a priori from P. They clearly cannot just assume it. If, however, it is the latter view (i.e., the view that the requisite information is part of P) that corresponds to Chalmers and Jackson’s official view, then, as I have argued, their position is also unsubstantiated: they have given us no reasons to think that P should express a comprehensive theory.
To remind the reader, (4) states the following: For every complete description V of world w, subject S is in a position to determine, on idealized rational reflection, the extension of a concept C in w.
Diaz-Leon (personal communication) helpfully points out that her aim was to establish the following conditional claim: if we use Chalmers and Jackson’s notion of the a priori (or their understanding of a priori entailment), then we no longer have reasons for believing that PTI does not entail Q a priori. According to Diaz-Leon, by assuming such a notion of a priori entailment (one that commits us to reductive ascriptivism), we can no longer rely on ordinary intuitions. That is because what is relevant to issues of a priori entailment is not what ordinary speakers say about the extension of the concepts that they possess, but rather what experts say (i.e., subjects who fully possess all relevant concepts and who have knowledge of reductive application conditionals). Although I am very sympathetic to Diaz-Leon’s argument, I still think that Chalmers and Jackson can deny that such an understanding of a priori entailment commits them to the view that the conditional PTI ⊃ Q is a priori. As I state in the body of the essay, Chalmers and Jackson could hold that the possession conditions of phenomenal concepts are unlike those of macrophysical concepts. For instance, they can maintain that one can fully possess a phenomenal concept (i.e., one can be an expert about the use of a phenomenal concept) without knowing anything about their (micro-) physical application conditions.
I am grateful to Alex Byrne, Daniel O. Dahlstrom, Esa Diaz-Leon, John Grey, Walter Hopp, and David Liebesman for helpful comments on previous versions of this article. I would also like to thank an anonymous referee for Acta Analytica and two anonymous referees for Philosophers’ Imprint.
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Elpidorou, A. Blocking the A Priori Passage. Acta Anal 29, 285–307 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-013-0206-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-013-0206-4