Abstract:
The Kantian concept of self-legislation plays a central role in Robert Pippin’s influential interpretation of Hegel’s theory of freedom. I isolate two competing notions of freedom present within Pippin’s own specification of the concept: freedom as reflective transparency and freedom as self-identification with one’s deeds. The former is compatible with Hegel’s own quasi-Spinozist conception of freedom and allows for historical conceptual change. It is also consistent with Pippin’s truly Hegelian contention that the justification of “modern ethical life” must assume the form of a historical, developmental account, and that a plurality of our moral and social attachments can be integral to our freedom. The ideal of self-identification. however, and Pippin’s development of it in terms of self-legislation and a theory of the normative social conditions of rational agency, involves a dichotomous conception of freedom that is incompatible with Hegel’s. Pippin’s ultimate privileging of self-legislation thus introduces a tension into his account and prevents him from achieving his distinctly Hegelian ambitions.
© De Gruyter
