Abstract
This paper argues for a pragmatic motivation for believing Presentism—the thesis that everything is present. After outlining a pragmatic source of justification for beliefs, in terms of their action-guiding aims, a pragmatic motivation for believing presentism is detailed and proffered. More specifically, the paper outlines two kinds of bases for our desires: a negative and a positive basis. The former concerns some dissatisfaction with a certain aspect of our present state, whilst the latter focuses instead on our potential future gratification or contentment. An account of desire satisfaction needs to, in some sense, “answers” to either of these kinds of bases. However, it is argued that only presentism can support an adequate conception of desire satisfaction (that allows for adequate “answers” to those bases). And although non-presentists can support a form of desire prevention (essentially preventing the arising of desire bases demanding “answers”), this severely lessens the effectiveness of beliefs to fulfil their aims. Accordingly, presentism is best able to support beliefs in achieving their action-guiding aims. It is claimed that this provides some pragmatic justification for believing presentism.
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Notes
Note that the forthcoming argument could still have import even if we thought that beliefs instead crucially aim at truth. After all, belief in presentism would nonetheless have the pragmatic motivation in spite of (or perhaps merely additionally to) the truth-directed or knowledge-directed goals of beliefs. And there are ways that pragmatic motivations can reasonably influence belief where the goals of belief are truth or knowledge, as with pragmatic encroachment (cf. Stanley 2005), where pragmatic considerations are deemed to make a difference to knowledge, such as in deciding the standards of justification required for knowledge. Though, of course, the motivation for presentism would be weaker on such alternative grounds, since presentism would no longer be functionally essential for belief. Note also, I am simply proposing here that we be pragmatic about what justifications for beliefs are acceptable; I am not proposing anything like a pragmatic account of truth, and will remain neutral about the nature of truth here (though I am sympathetic to a correspondence account).
This point is not new, but its significance has I think been neglected. For instance, John Locke wrote:
Desire also is stopped or abated by the opinion of the impossibility or unattainableness of the good proposed, as far as uneasiness is cured or allayed by that consideration. (1689, Bk.II, Ch.XX, §.6, p. 217)
…the will being the power of directing our operative faculties to some action, for some end, cannot at any time be moved towards what is judged at that time attainable; that would be to suppose an intelligent being designedly to act for an end, only to lose its labour; for it is to act for what is judged not attainable; and therefore very great uneasiness move not the will, when they are judged not capable of a cure: they, in that case, put us not upon endeavours. (Ibid. Ch.XXI, §.40, p. 238).
In terms of decision-theory, we can say the outcomes of holding functionally essential beliefs dominates the outcomes of not holding them; holding those beliefs offer outcomes equal to, or better than, not believing them.
It is not surprising that in such circumstances people develop, or appeal to, new beliefs, like belief in an interventionist deity (responsive to petitionary prayer), that empower them with potentially effective actions (e.g. petitionary prayer). Why not? What would we have to lose?
There is room here for false beliefs to bear a degree of resemblance to reality so that they nevertheless inspire successful action in most or many situations.
This is not to say that false belief cannot serve effective action better than true beliefs, but merely that they are generally less likely to.
The forthcoming argument has a (relatively superficial) resemblance (primarily in kind rather than substance) to Arthur Prior’s (1959) argument that expressions like ‘thank goodness that’s over’ cannot be given a tenseless semantics. The argument that I am offering here, however, is quite distinct. There are several important differences, including: (i) where Prior is concerned with the transitory presence of experiences, I am concerned with desire satisfaction (whenever those desires are at); (ii) I am arguing for presentism, rather than a semantic thesis; (iii) my primary justification comes from the action-guiding aim of beliefs rather than the popularity of certain temporally asymmetric attitudes. Moreover, since the response to Prior’s argument have been concerned merely with explaining temporally asymmetric attitudes or the rationality/irrationality of them, they also entirely fail to touch on the issues raised by my argument, which rather justifies belief in presentism (which is not even a temporally asymmetric belief), regardless of whether that attitude is held, on the basis of its uniquely supporting desire satisfaction; these are simply different issues. Accordingly, I will not waste space discussing them here.
Indeed, I believe that such an account of the motivational basis for belief, help explain why certain philosophers have been unable to believe in practice what they have convinced themselves of in theory (cf. David Hume, 1739, Bk.1, Pt.IV, §. VII).
We find a similar view espoused by Locke, where he speaks of “uneasiness” in place of “suffering”:
…the chief if not the only spur to human industry and action, is uneasiness. For whatever good is proposed, if its absence carries no displeasure nor pain with it; if a man be easy and content without it, there is no desire of it, nor endeavour after it; there is no more but a bare velleity, the term used to signify the lowest degree of desire, and which is next to none at all, when there is so little uneasiness in the absence of anything, that it carries a man no further than some faint wishes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous use of the means to attain it. (1689, Bk. II, Ch. XX, §. 6, p. 217).
For instance, we get this impression from Locke when he identifies the removal of pleasure as a pain, and the removal of pain as a pleasure: ‘…in reference to the passions, the removal or lessening of a pain is considered, and operates as a pleasure: and the loss or diminishing of a pleasure, as a pain.’ (1689, Bk. II, Ch. XX, §.16, p. 219). Schopenhauer likewise identifies happiness with the removal of suffering, but gives the added twist that happiness is a negative phenomenon, as the mere absence of suffering: ‘all happiness is only of a negative, not a positive nature, and that for this reason it cannot be lasting satisfaction and gratification, but always delivers us only from a pain or want that must be followed either by a new pain or by languor, empty longing, and boredom.’ (1859, p. 320). Locke, however, differs subtly from Schopenhauer on this issue, treating happiness as a partly positive phenomenon: ‘Happiness and misery are the names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not’ (1689, Bk.II, Ch. XXI, §. 41, p. 238) and ‘Happiness then in its full extent is the utmost pleasure we are capable of and misery the utmost pain: and the lowest degree of what can be called happiness, is so much ease from all pain, and so much present pleasure, as without which anyone cannot be content.’ (Ibid., §. 42, p. 239). And he also entertains the positivity of the mere approach of relief: ‘Joy is a delight of the mind, from the consideration of the present or assured approaching possession of a good; and we are then possessed of any good, when we have it so in our power, that we can use it when we please. Thus a man almost starved, has joy at the arrival of relief, even before he has the pleasure of using it…’ (Ibid., Ch. XX, §. 7, p. 217).
It is important to distinguish our desires from our more cognitively developed attitudes, such as our will. For we can, and often must, set our will against our desires. As Locke puts it: ‘…the will is perfectly distinguished from desire, which in the very same action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our wills set upon.’ (1689, Bk. II, Ch. XXI, §. 30, p. 232).
Given that our desires determine our will and are often (at least practically) in conflict, this raises for him the question: ‘But we being in this world beset with sundry uneasiness, distracted with different desires, the next inquiry naturally will be, which of them has the precedency in determining the will to the next action?’ (Ibid., §. 40, p. 238). His answer was that it is determined by the most pressing (though can be suspended through an expression of an agent’s liberty); however, I think this question lies squarely in the realm of psychological science to discover through empirical study.
It is difficult to distinguish absolute metaphysical changes to reality from mere temporal variations within reality. However, a clear elaboration of this distinction that I agree with can be found in Pezet (2017a, §3). On that account, absolute metaphysical changes to reality therein is changes in what is part of reality as of present; whereby what is part of reality as of present is potentially inclusive of that which is not present (such as merely past or future entities) if such there be. By contrast, mere temporal variation involves no changes in what is part of reality as of present, but instead “changes” or difference between how things are at times within reality (past, present, and future).
Schopenhauer fully accepts the rather unpalatable consequence of his view that death is the ultimate satisfier of desires: ‘if death comes, […] then it is most welcome, and cheerfully accepted as a longed-for deliverance.’ (1859, p. 382).
Defenders of Schopenhauer may offer some resistance to the parenthesised clause. Since, according to Julian Young (2005, p. 189), Schopenhauer defends a conservation of pain (dissatisfaction) principle, whereby we maintain a constant level of dissatisfaction according to our temperament. In Schopenhauer’s words: ‘The ceaseless efforts to banish suffering achieve nothing more than a change in its form.’ (1859, p. 315). But importantly, Schopenhauer does not quite accept the conservation of dissatisfaction, but rather its homeostasis. For, he does allow temporary divergence from the otherwise steady level of dissatisfaction upon the satisfaction of a desire or sudden increase in our dissatisfaction:
in every individual the measure of the pain essential to him has been determined once and for all by his nature, a measure that could not remain empty or be filled to excess, however much he form of the suffering might change. Accordingly, his suffering and well-being would not be determined at all from without, but only by that measure, that disposition, which might in fact through the physical condition experience some increase and decrease at different times, but which on the whole would remain the same, and would be nothing but what is called temperament. (Ibid., p. 316)
Only the moment of appearance of these changes [‘great misfortune’ and ‘long-desired happiness’] moves us with unusual strength, as deep distress or shouts of joy; but both of these soon disappear, because they rested on illusion. (Ibid.).
An eternalist metaphysics can be elaborated in a number of alternative ways. It is typically developed into the B-Theory of Time (cf. Le Poidevin 1991) by its combination with Internal Relativisim—the thesis that all facts about what is past, present, and future are temporally relative—and Permanentism—the thesis that ‘always everything is always something’ (Williamson 2013, p. 4). Alternatively, eternalism can be developed into the Moving-Spotlight Theory (cf. Schlesinger 1980) by its combination with Presentness Objectivism—the thesis that there is a metaphysical privilege of presentness that some things have—as well as permanentism and temporal dynamism. Similarly, eternalism can be developed into the Shrinking-Tree Theory (cf. McCall 1994) by its combination with present objectivism, Temporaryism—the denial of permanentism—, Forking-Futurism—the thesis that there is a branching future (capturing future possibilities)—and Linear-Pastism—the thesis that there is a linear past (capturing the settled-ness of the past). These more nuanced kinds of eternalist distinctions should not impact on our discussion, so I shall treat them here collectively under the heading of eternalist metaphysics.
Some will undoubtedly complain here that there are some recent formulations of certain non-presentisms that do allow for the removal of the dissatisfactory aspects from our present state when they become past. In particular, certain non-presentist A-Theories – whereby reality undergoes some real metaphysical changes over time (such that the A-determination, pastness, presentness, and futurity are irreducibly real), rather than merely varying in what obtains at each time (for more on this distinction, see Pezet, 2017a, §3)—despite positing the continued reality of events and things as they become past, nevertheless think that they can substantively change in their nature from how they were when present, when they become past. Let us collectively call all such accounts of time Non-Ludovician (following van Inwagen’s 2010 terminology). For instance, according to some Growing-Block Theorists, upon becoming past, people turn into non-living, non-conscious zombies (cf. Forrest 2004, 2006; Forbes 2010: Ch. 3, 2016). Likewise, according to some Moving-Spotlight Theorists (see footnote 16), non-present things are only conscious, alive, and in other ways “causally active”, when they are present (cf. Skow 2015: Ch. 10 and §12.2; though Skow does not himself actually endorsing this view), or all recognisable present characteristics of a thing are to some extent dissipated (perhaps ex-concrete) when non-present (cf. Cameron 2015: Ch. 5; Williamson 2002, 2013). I understand that this idea has become recently popular in some circles. However, personally, I am unconvinced; I think all such views are incoherent – or are at least incorrectly described, and rather are just obscure versions of presentism, giving the illusion of the possibility of non-Ludovician time – for the reasons stated in Pezet (2017b), whereby the commitment to changing of what happens at a time crucially breaks certain inviolable axioms of time, such as that what was or will be must at some time be present. Nevertheless, if I am wrong about this, then the argument in this paper can be used to favour such non-Ludovician ways of developing certain A-theories besides presentism. There is of course no defence here for B-theory, which is presentism’s main competitor, and so the argument in this paper will still be significant.
An exception here may be changes in the degree of pastness.
The resulting behaviour strikes me as being particularly life-denying, rather life-affirming, in outlook.
Similarly, individuating desires by their ends makes little sense of ambivalence, where an individual feels a strong pull towards conflicting ends. Perhaps one of these desires is stronger and wins through. This may affect how we feel about the ends of the weaker defeated desire. Indeed, we may no longer wish for those ends. If desires were individuated by their ends, instead of their bases, that weaker desire would seemingly not be a desire, or at least not the same desire as what it would have been absent the stronger dominating desire. Yet, we would still feel what is dissatisfying about our situation with respect to that weaker desire, and our theory would be missing something important about the phenomenology of ambivalence if it did not recognise the presence of that weaker desire. Only by individuating desires (at least partly) by their bases can we do justice to what is going on in such cases of ambivalence.
Note, that even if non-presentism found a way to support one or the other of the positive or negative aspects of desire satisfaction, its inability to support both would still be disadvantageous; since, as earlier noted, a full account of desire satisfaction ought to consist in both the removal of the dissatisfactory aspect of our present state and the attaining of some gratifying aspect in our future state – the two aspects having varying degrees of prominence with respect to different desires and dependent on the nature of its (positive and negative) bases.
For those unfamiliar with the terminology, I have defined the B-Theory of Time in footnote 16. But for our purposes, all that matters is that B-theory is a form of eternalism. (Note also that Le Poidevin is nonetheless a long-term advocate of B-theory).
To reinforce my ascription of the “hellish” adjective to non-presentist reality, consider again Dante Alighieri’s Inferno, where the infernal punishment of those placed in the first circle of hell (Limbo) just is the torment of their own insatiable desire: ‘For these defects, and for no other evil, we now are lost and punished just with this: we have no hope and yet we live in longing.’ (1321, Canto IV, Lines 40–42).
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Acknowledgements
Thanks are due to the audience of the ‘Time after Time’ S.P.o.T. workshop at the University of Bonn for listening and providing feedback on a presentation of the research in this paper.
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Pezet, R.E. Finding satisfaction in presentism. Synthese 197, 4519–4531 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01940-w
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-01940-w