Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Making a Useful ‘Model’ for Managers: A Projective Constructivist Account

  • Published:
Philosophy of Management Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Models and modelling are central not only to management but to all human affairs. Models provide grounds for decision making and action-taking. This paper investigates the concept of ‘model’, showing that the conventional notion of a model as understood in management science, a notion founded on positivism and realism, is insufficient for the complex practical needs of management models. To remedy this situation, an alternative notion founded on Projective Constructivist Epistemology (PCE) is proposed. Some of the implications of the new notion for modelling practice and model validation are also discussed. The new notion results from theoretical investigations and empirical experience gleaned over the last five years in public-sector, military and business contexts. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of areas that might merit investigation in the future.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Bunnell P ‘Modeling as an ethical action’ Cybernetics & Human Knowing Vol 6 No 3 1999 pp 93–96 (quotation p 96)

  2. p 7 in: Simon H A ‘Prediction and prescription in systems modeling’ Operations Research Vol 38 No 1 1990 pp 7–14

  3. Stoner J A F & Freeman R EManagement 5th ed Prentice-Hall, N J 1992 p 8

  4. Gass S I, Harris C M 1996 Encyclopedia of Operations Research and Management Science Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston, p 399

  5. von Glaserfeld E The construction of knowledge Intersystems Pub Salinas, CA 1988 p 137 Watzlawick P The invented reality New York, Norton 1997; Bettoni, M ‘Constructivist foundation of modeling A Kantian Perspective’ Int J of Intelligent Systems, 12(8) pp 577–595; Le Moigne J L Le Constructivisme, Tome 1: Des Fondaments ESF, Paris 1994; Le Moigne J L Le Constructivisme, Tome 2: Des Epistémologies ESF, Paris 1995a; Le Moigne J L Que Sais-Je? Les Épistémologies Constructivistes PUF, Paris 1995b.

  6. It is important to recognise the difference between theoretical or prepositional knowledge and practical or so-called tacit knowledge (Polanyi, M The Tacit Dimension Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 1967); in this context model should be associated mainly with theoretical knowledge. The importance of practical knowledge is manifested when a complex model is to be implemented in practice — there is a gap between the model and the practice, things happen that the model does not articulate or anticipate. The issue of model implementation and practical knowledge is not addressed in the present text, but requires separate treatment.

  7. For a basic introduction, see: Landesman, C An Introduction to Epistemology Blackwell, Cambridge, MA 1997

  8. See respectively Piaget J La construction du réel chez l’enfant, Neuchâtel, Delachaux et Niestlé 1937 (The construction of reality in the child tr Cook M, New York, Basic Books 1971); Piaget J (ed) Logique et connaissance scientifique Gallimard-Encyclopédie de la Pléiade, Paris 1967; Bateson G Steps to an ecology of mind Ballantine Book, New York 1972; von Foerster H Observing systems 2nd ed Intersystems Publications, Seaside, C A 1984; Maturana H R, Varela F J The Tree of Knowledge: the biological roots of human understanding Shambhala, Boston rev ed 1992; von Glaserfeld E Radical Constructivism A way of knowing and learning The Flamer Press, London 1995; Watzlawick P How real is real? New York, Vintage 1977

  9. Heinz von Foerster — one of the main proponents of constructivists — wrote: ‘The only thing we know for sure is that there is a stimulus or perturbation. This is the only thing that the nerve cell communicates. The cause for the perturbation is unclear, however. It is not specifically coded. For example, you could excite the fibers of the optic nerve with a drop of vinegar, and would most likely perceive a colored spot of light. Or you could use an electrode to stimulate a taste bud with a few volts, and you may have a sensation of the taste of vinegar. With these observations in mind, and they can be found in any textbook on the essentials of psychology, it is absolutely grotesque and downright stupid to talk about representation of the outer world in the inner world.’ (in: Understanding Systems. Conversations on Epistemology and Ethics Heinz von Foester and Bernhard Poerksen, Carl-Auer-Systeme Verlag Heidelberg 2002 p 18)

  10. Maturana & Varela op cit 1992

  11. von Glaserfeld op cit 1995

  12. Le Moigne op cit 1995b

  13. An exposition in English of Le Moigne’s projective Constructivist Epistemology may be found in: Eriksson, D M 1997 ‘A principal exposition of Jean-Louis Le Moigne’s Systemic Theory’ Cybernetics & Human Knowing Vol 4, No 2–3, pp 35–77

  14. Le Moigne J L 1990 La modélisation des systèmes complexes Dunod, Paris; Le Moigne J L 1994b La théorie du système général. Théorie de la modélisation PUF, Paris; Le Moigne J L ‘Qu’est-ce qu’un Modèle?’ in Confrontations Psychiatriques Numéro Spécial consacré aux Modèles 1987

  15. Piaget op cit 1967

  16. The two remaining epistemological questions, the how and the why, focus on the method of model construction and on the validity status, respectively. These are central modelling issues, although for reasons of space they are addressed at the end of this essay, particularly the validity status.

  17. The main source for this presentation is Le Moigne op cit 1994a, 1995a, 1995b

  18. This strong statement is argued extensively by Le Moigne (op cit 1994a, 1005a, 1995b). Among others, the argument refers to the seminal article of N Wiener, A Rosenblueth and J Bigelow (1943) Behaviour, Purpose and Teleology that acted as a kind of catalyst for the epistemological mediations, reintroducing the old thesis of teleology. The everyday experience shows that the same cause does not always lead to the same effect, as was proclaimed by R Boudon (A quoi sert la notion de structure? Gallimard, Paris, 1968). The latter showed that there are four possible correspondences and not one, between the occurrences of two sets of events: A and B. Occurrences of B may in effect be rationally identifiable and interpretable according to whether the occurrence of A is or is not necessary to it, and whether it is or is not sufficient to it. In one correspondence A is a causal one, hence a necessary and sufficient condition to B. While in the three others it is not the case — ‘an acorn does not always cause an oak’, as it is necessary but not sufficient. Thus Le Moigne (op cit 1977–1994:38) asks whether they are: ‘…devoid of reason and not worthy of rational knowledge?’

  19. To be clear, the Phenomenological Hypothesis does not deny the existence of an independent physical reality as such — in a way it pre-supposes it — rather the hypothesis articulates the status of knowledge of this reality, however, it does not accept the notion of naïve realism which assumes human to acquire conform knowledge of an independent reality.

  20. Pirsig R M Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance Bantam Books, NY 1981 p 215

  21. ’Atomist’ and’ holist’ are the terms used by Le Moigne.

  22. op cit Le Moigne 1995 b:73

  23. Prigogine I, Stengers I La nouvelle alliance Paris, Gallimard, NRF 1979

  24. Dubos R ‘We Shall Have to get Away from Claude Bernard’ Co-evolution, no 6 Autumn 1981 pp 28–32

  25. Varela F J ‘A calculus for self-reference’ Int J Gen Syst Vol 2, 1975 pp 5–24; and Varela F J’ Circulus fructuosus: Revisiting self-reference as a scientific notion’ In: Proceedings of Annual Meeting of Society for General Systems Researc Denver, Colorado 1977 pp 116–118

  26. Le Moigne op cit 1990

  27. Simon op cit 1990 p 13

  28. The case was a management consulting engagement performed by the author and his colleagues.

  29. It is true, of course, that some if not all of the elements of the model may exist already eg employees, roles. However, their configuration in the model does not exist and indeed may never be implemented.

  30. For a definition and distinction of the two types of strategies, see: Hax A C, Wilde II, D L ‘The Delta Model’ Sloan Management Review No 2 Vol 40 Winter 1999

  31. These articulate the organisations objectives and their inter-relation. See for example the Balanced Score Card approach, including its ‘Strategic Mapping’ (Kaplan, R S & Norton, D P 1996 The Balanced Scorecard Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Mass)

  32. For more elaborate discussion of this categorisation, see: Jackson M C Systems Methodologies for Management Science, Plenum Press, NY

  33. Ackoff,R L 1962 Scientific Method: Optimizing Applied Research Decisions Wiley, New York 1991

  34. Simon op cit 1990 p 13

  35. p 4 Le Moigne J L ‘Formalism of systemic modelling’ in: Some Physicochemical and Mathematical Tools for Understanding of Living Systems Greppin H, Bonzon M, Degli Agosti R (eds) University of Geneva 1993

  36. Le Moigne op cit 1993 p 4

  37. Simon H A Models of Bounded Rationality MIT Press, Cambridge Mass 1982 p 304

  38. Le Moigne op cit 1993 p 5

  39. This resembles Charles Pierces notion of truth, as he put it: ‘In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception, one should consider what practical consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception.’ (Pierce C Collected Papers of Charles Pierce Vols 1–6, Hartshorne C and Weiss P (eds) 1931–1958: Vol 5, Para 9) The teleological property was, however, not articulated clearly.

  40. Le Moigne op cit 1995a, p 40

  41. The ‘Unified Modeling Language’, for software modeling, has become a de facto standard, see: Booch G, Rumbaugh J, Jacobson, I The Unified Modeling Language User Guide Addison-Wesley, Massachusetts 1999. Meanwhile, the so-called ‘Rational Unified Process’ has become the de facto standard as a process for the use of the Unified Modeling Language. The Rational Unified Process articulates an experimental, incremental and iterative approach to model building see: Jacobson I, Booch G, Rumbaugh J The Unified Software Development Process Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1998

  42. A similar approach to model building has long been advocated by so-called Soft Systems Methodology, founded on phenomenology; see Checkland P B, S choies J Soft Systems Methodology in Action Wiley, Chichester 1990

  43. Piaget op cit 1937

  44. In this regard we have made a minor contribution: Eriksson D M ‘A framework for the constitution of modelling processes: A proposition’ European Journal of Operational Research 145, 2003 pp 202–215

  45. Churchman C W The Design of Inquiring Systems Basic Books, New York 1971

  46. Berger P, Luckmann T The Social Construction of Reality A treatise in the sociology of knowledge Penguin Books, London 1967; Mackie J L Ethics: inventing right and wrong Penguin, Harmondsworth 1977; Gregen K ‘Social Construction and the Educational Process’ In: Constructivism in Education Steffe L P, Gale J (eds) Hillsdale N J: Erlbaum 1995 pp 17–39; Searle J R The Construction of Social Reality Penguin Books, England 1995

Download references

Authors
  1. Darek M. Eriksson
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Eriksson, D.M. Making a Useful ‘Model’ for Managers: A Projective Constructivist Account. Philos. of Manag. 4, 19–34 (2004). https://doi.org/10.5840/pom20044219

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.5840/pom20044219

Keywords

Search

Navigation