Abstract
A major problem within the philosophy of romantic love is that the following three claims apparently cannot be true together, even though each looks plausible: [1]. We love people because of their lovable features. [2]. Lovable features can (in principle) have multiple instantiations. 3. When we love someone, the person is irreplaceable for us. If we love someone because of her lovable features, and if a second person can (in principle) have the same lovable features, then the person we love can (in principle) be replaced. I propose a solution for this problem in three steps: I start with some methodological reflections. Secondly, I discuss some proposed solutions from the literature and clarify the first two claims of the trilemma in the process. Thirdly, I present my own solution which focuses on the third claim and which is based on a distinction between a feeling of love on the one hand and a commitment of love on the other. As it turns out, all three claims can be true when interpreted with this distinction in mind.
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