Abstract
To ensure the protection and promotion of human rights at the African regional level, the African human rights system was established and has been in existence for over three decades. In realisation of its mandates, three supervisory mechanisms have been established to adjudicate human rights cases and issue decisions accordingly. To enhance compliance with these decisions, human rights non-governmental organisations, civil society organisations (NGOs/CSOs) and the supervisory bodies themselves often act as sources of pressure by exploring different follow-up mechanisms. However, despite their best efforts, the attitude of member states towards compliance with the decisions of the supervisory bodies has been relatively poor. Against this background, this article argues that in improving compliance, civil society—particularly the electorates—in member states can equally be engaged to act as a complementary domestic source of pressure with the aim of raising domestic costs in pressuring member states towards compliance.
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Notes
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was established on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa with 32 signatory governments. See Art 2 of the OAU Charter. Note that the OAU has since 2001 been replaced by the African Union (AU) following a decision declaring the establishment of the AU based on the unanimous decision of member states adopted by the 5th Extraordinary OAU/AEC summit held in Sirte, Libya, from 1 to 2 March 2001.
The African Charter is an international human rights instrument which was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU on 27 June 1981 and entered into force on 21 October 1986. The Charter has been ratified by 55 member states. The African Charter sets out the rights and duties of African people as it affects the rights of other persons and their respective countries.
It is conceded that in the context of this article, CS which represent the wider domestic society—different from government—do engage in different direct or indirect civic actions which include protest, strike, participation in periodic elections, lobbying, consultations and so on. However, in this article, elections have been singled out as a potential tool for CS to coax the political will of state actors to comply. The choice of election as a domestic model for CS is based on the argument that elections present a legitimate entry point for elected office seekers which then gives the voting public the opportunity to explore the electioneering processes to bring to the table of politicians and their political parties the needs of their constituents.
CS in the context of this article means the electorates or the voting public who form a critical component of the African societies in member states under the AHRS. This should be understood to mean that the government, its agencies and formal or organised groups/bodies who operate under the label of human rights NGOs/CSOs or any other related groups are not part of this configuration.
The human rights bodies covered by his reports include the African Commission, the Court, the Economic Community of West African States Community Court of Justice (the ECOWAS Court), the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) and the Southern African Development Community Tribunal (SADC).
Ayeni defines reparation orders as the ‘remedial obligations imposed on states by both judicial and quasijudicial HRTs’. He further explains that ‘most human rights cases have multiple reparation orders and some of these orders are multilayered....’ This explains the reason why in 32 cases, 75 reparation orders were sifted for his analysis (Ayeni 2018, pp. 23, 104).
Ingabira Victoire Umuhoza v Tanzania Application 003/2014; John Lazaro v Tanzania Application 003/2016.
See, for example, Viljoen citing a comment made by a former Zimbabwean Minister of information in reaction to one of the Commission’s resolutions against the Zimbabwean government (Viljoen 2012, p 294).
See Comm. No. 97/93, AHRLR 30 (ACHPR 2000).
See Comm. No. 212/98, AHRLR 325 (ACHPR 1999).
See Comm. No. 223/98, AHRLR 293 (ACHPR 2000).
Constitutional Rights Projects (in respect of Lekwot & six others) v Nigeria Communication 87/93
(2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1998)
I implore the term ‘directly’ to explain the Commission’s direct involvement in mission visits, while the term ‘indirectly’ relates to follow up on decision through the work of its special rapporteurs on specific task.
See the Commission’s statements and press releases on human rights situations, http://www.achpr.org/search/?y=2019&t=835%7C924, accessed 25 April 2019.
Art 43, 45(1) of the African Children’s Charter
Art 31 of the Protocol on the establishment of the African Human Rights Court
Art 29(2) of the Court’s Protocol.
See the draft framework for reporting & monitoring execution of judgements and other decisions of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ex.CL/Dec.806 (XXIV) of January 2016 and Ex. CL/1012 (XXXIII) of June 2018; see also ‘The ACtHPR monitor: implementation of the judgment of the African on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2019), http://www.acthprmonitor.org/implementation-of-the-judgments-of-theafrican-court-on-human-and-peoples-rights/#prettyPhoto, accessed 11 November 2019.
See p 1–4 of the Ex. CL/1012 (XXXIII) Annex 1.
See p 4–6 of the Ex. CL/1012 (XXXIII) Annex 1.
Art 23 of the Constitutive Act of the AU
See p 4–10 of the Ex. CL/1012 (XXXIII) Annex 1.
The Charter was adopted in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 30 January 2007 and entered into force on 15 February 2012, http://www.au.int/en/treaties, accessed 17 October 2019.
See Art 13 of the Charter, Art 21 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and Art 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
In the context of this discourse, public goods may therefore include a broader understanding of government’s responsiveness to key electoral issues often raised by the voting public during the pre-election activities often held in town hall meetings, panel discussions, media channels, opinion polls and political campaigns, while private goods concern specific benefits that elected politicians provide to satisfy the political interest of members of their winning coalition or political party.
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Acknowledgements
This research was conducted by the author while undergoing the LLD program at the Centre for human rights, University of Pretoria. Thus, the article forms part of the author’s unpublished LLD thesis titled: ‘The role of civil society in promoting member state compliance with the decisions of the African human rights supervisory mechanisms’ University of Pretoria, 2019. My special thanks to my supervisors Professors Magnus Killander and Solomon T Ebobrah for their insightful comments on the thesis and the original draft of this article.
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Etuvoata, A.E. Towards Improved Compliance with Human Rights Decisions in the African Human Rights System: Enhancing the Role of Civil Society. Hum Rights Rev 21, 415–436 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-020-00603-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-020-00603-z