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Norton’s Objective Temporal Passage

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Abstract

This paper considers one unique solution to the puzzle of temporal passage in the block universe. (Norton, Humana. Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies 13:23–34, 2010) argues that, although a precise description of its workings is currently beyond our understanding, time really passes. After introducing Norton’s account, I argue that it both implies a counterintuitive relationship between the “now” and passage and that it leads to an unlikely relationship between our experience and reality. I then propose that, even if one is willing to accept these consequences, there is reason to question whether Norton builds a convincing case for the claim that, since we are not able to find any of the identifying characteristics of an illusion in the case of temporal passage, the passage of time is not an illusion.

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Notes

  1. For exceptions to this see Maudlin (2007) or Mozersky (2015), for instance.

  2. Here we might want to add the caveat that this holds for matter travelling at subluminal speeds.

  3. Dennett and Kinsbourne (2011) offer such an analysis.

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Correspondence to Kyley Ewing.

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Ewing, K. Norton’s Objective Temporal Passage. Philosophia 50, 65–74 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00386-8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00386-8

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