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Should epistemology take the zetetic turn?

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Abstract

What is the relationship between inquiry and epistemology? Are epistemic norms the norms that guide us as inquirers—as agents in the pursuit of knowledge and understanding? Recently, there has been growing support for what I, following Friedman (Philosophical Review 129(4):501–536, 2020), will call the zetetic turn in epistemology, the view that all epistemic norms are norms of inquiry. This paper investigates the prospects of an inquiry-centered approach to epistemology and develops several motivations for resisting it. First, I argue that the norms of inquiry are most plausibly seen as practical, not as distinctively epistemic. Second, I argue that a zetetically-grounded epistemology is unable to properly account for the rationality of belief. It fails to account for cases where intuitively irrational beliefs promote inquiry, or where intuitively rational beliefs are zetetically useless or counterproductive to inquiry. The main upshot is this: there must be a source of epistemic normativity that isn’t ultimately zetetic.

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Notes

  1. This terminology follows (Friedman; 2020, 501). ‘Zetetic’ means roughly ‘proceeding by inquiry’, but for our purposes, it will mean something looser like, having to do with inquiry. Uses of the expression “zetetic” in contemporary epistemology are also found in Axell and Olson (2009), and Axell (2011).

  2. The phrase “zetetic turn” can also be used in a broader way, to refer simply to turning our attention more towards zetetic norms, see Thorstad (2021); Flores and Woodard (2023); McWilliams (2023). Here I’ll use it to refer to the more ambitious program of grounding all epistemic norms in zetetic ones, see Friedman (2020, Forth), Steglich-Petersen (2021), and Kelp (2021, 2020).

  3. Kelp (2020, 2021) indirectly argues for this view. He takes this position for granted and uses it to address several debates in epistemology concerning the nature of epistemic phenomena, the value of knowledge, and skepticism. I discuss Kelp’s approach to zetetic epistemology in §3 and §5.

  4. Friedman (2020, 526) argues for the view that zetetic norms and epistemic norms are identical. I will be targeting a weaker claim in the paper, namely, that all epistemic norms are zetetic. This leaves open the possibility of non-epistemic zetetic norms (e.g., moral norms of inquiry which tell one to inquire into the well-being of a loved one).

  5. For influential defenses of evidentialism see: Conee and Feldman (1985, 2004); Feldman (2000).

  6. However, Friedman notes that EP and KP are diachronic norms that concern acts (i.e., the processes of coming to believe or know that p), opposed to synchronic norms which evaluate epistemic states directly at a time (Friedman; 2020, 504). For related discussion see Haziza (2022).

  7. Friedman (2020), fn. 34, notes that Lasonen-Aarnio’s (2010) account of “unreasonable knowledge” might open space for the rejection of KP.

  8. Here I am granting, for the sake of argument, that there are instrumental or practical reasons to believe. However, see, for example, Berker (2018) and Arpaly (ms.) for arguments against this view.

  9. This traces back most prominently to the debate between Clifford (1877) and James (1897). For a contemporary overview of this debate see Marušić (2011) and Chignell (2018).

  10. This analogy follows arguments given in Arpaly (ms.), which argues that there are no epistemic reasons to perform actions. Also see related arguments from Kelly (2003); Raz (2009); Nelson (2010); Cohen (2016) and Simion (2018) against epistemic reasons to act.

  11. See Fleisher (2018, 2022), Singer and Aronowitz (Forth); Thorstad (2022) and Arpaly (ms.) for discussion of “sandwich reasons.”.

  12. There is an ongoing debate in the literature concerning what the aim of inquiry is. For defenses of the view that the aim of inquiry is true belief see, for example, Kvanvig (2003). For a defense of the view that the aim of inquiry is knowledge see, for example: Sartwell (1992); Whitcomb (2010); Rysiew (2012); Kelp (2014, 2020); Sapir and van Elswyk (2021). This view is also suggested in Friedman (2017). Also see, for example, Falbo (2021, 2022); Archer (2021); Woodard (2022) for defenses of the view that inquiry aims at epistemic improvement, and Goodman and Holguín (2022) who argue that inquiry aims at being sure, as well as Beddor (Manuscript), who argues that inquiry aims at maximizing epistemic value. For a critical discussion which casts doubt upon whether inquiry has a constitutive aim see Friedman (2023). The paper remains neutral on what the aim of inquiry is.

  13. For a related discussion of similar detective-style cases see (Friedman; 2019b, 300–306).

  14. When defending this point Kelp draws upon the work of Sosa (2007).

  15. Thank you to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to consider this response.

  16. For a compelling defense of this point see Friedman (2023).

  17. United States Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service: https://www.fns.usda.gov/.

  18. Thorstad (2021)’s discussion of evaluative focal points draws upon terminology developed in Kagan (2000).

  19. See the discussion in Friedman (2020, 521–522) which suggests a close connection between epistemic norms on belief states and norms on when one is permitted to inquire such that one enters into a belief state, and for related arguments see Steglich-Petersen (2021). Also see the related arguments in Fleisher (2022), who argues that there are zetetic reasons (or what he calls inquisitive reasons) to be in belief-like states such as acceptance or endorsement.

  20. While Thorstad (2021) adopts a value-based conception of epistemic normativity, in other work, Thorstad (2022), he is critical of this view. There is debate in the literature concerning what kinds of things count as having final epistemic value. For a sample of this debate see: Lynch (2009); Ahlstrom-Vij (2013); Pritchard (2014); Khalifa and Millson (2020). Also see Friedman (2019a) for related discussion. A value-based approach is also central to defenses of epistemic consequentialism. I discuss epistemic consequentialism in §5.1.

  21. Friedman (2019a, 680–681) discusses a similar example where a boss ignores strong evidence that he’s not loved by his employees, and refrains from coming to know this because it will interfere with his inquiry. She argues that the Boss isn’t rationally permitted to come to know that he’s unloved, despite being in a position to know this. Mr. Congeniality takes this style of case a step further by highlighting how the success of inquiry can be promoted by believing against the evidence too. See Thorstad (2021, 2915–2916) for related discussion of this case.

  22. For further discussion see the collection of papers in Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn (2018). And for further discussions of epistemic trade-off cases see, for example, Christensen (2004) Ch. 6, Berker (2013a,b); Jenkins (2007); Littlejohn (2012); Singer (2019) and Aronowitz (2021).

  23. Also see: Friedman (Forth); Olsson and Westlund (2006); Enqvist (2012) for further discussion of research agendas.

  24. See Dallman (2017) for a discussion of how to prioritize our inquiries given our cognitive limitations.

  25. Thank you to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to consider this objection.

  26. See Kelp; (2021, 196–202) Appendix 2 for further discussion of how this view relates to virtue epistemology.

  27. I consider this point further in §5.2.

  28. Thank you to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to consider this point.

  29. Also, cf. (Friedman; 2019a, 2019b, 2019c, 684–685): “It’s understandable, I think, to want some sort of explanation as to why we should conform to our central epistemic norms.” And also, Friedman (Forth): “If our traditional epistemic norms are not the sorts of norms we ought to conform to in order to successfully figure things out, then why should we conform to them at all?” It’s worth reflecting upon whether the epistemologist is on the hook to answer the why conform question. Consider an analogous question in the moral domain: why should we conform to moral norms? We don’t conform to moral norms because they advance some antecedent goal of ours or because it’s always in our personal interest to do so. Indeed, moral norms apply to us regardless of—and even when they go against—our personal interests and goals. A similar point seems to hold in the epistemic domain: epistemic norms apply to us regardless of—and even when they go against—our personal interests and zetetic goals. Epistemic norms aren’t beholden to our wants and needs. So, one might plausibly resist the claim that epistemologists should be expected or able to provide an answer to the why conform question. See Kelly (2003) for related discussion. This topic merits further consideration but taking it up would take the paper too far afield. Thanks to David Christensen for helpful discussion, and for pointing out the comparison to the moral domain.

  30. There is a growing literature of fascinating work on salience and norms of attention. See, for example: Siegel (2017, 2022), Irving (2021), Yumusak (2022), Gardiner (2022), Saint-Croix (2022) and Munton (2022, 2023).

  31. For discussion see: Friedman (2017), Whitcomb (2017), Sapir and van Elswyk (2021), Whitcomb and Millson (2023), Willard-Kyle (forthcoming).

  32. For further discussion see Friedman (Forth) on the distinction between accidental and intentional forms of learning. Friedman’s discussion draws upon a much earlier distinction between experiment and observation found in Hershel (1831).

  33. Thank you to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to consider this point.

  34. Hookway is primarily concerned with the value of knowledge, though his arguments carry over to the case of rational belief. Also see the related discussion in (Kelp; 2021, 57–58).

  35. Although see Steglich-Petersen (2021) who offers distinct motivations for the zetetic turn.

  36. See, for example, Feldman (2000), Kelly (2003, 2007), Berker (2018), Steglich-Petersen and Skipper (2019) and Howard (2020).

  37. A useful list of topics is given in the “Inquiry” page on PhilPapers, which was created in 2020, and is edited by Joshua Habgood-Coote. URL: https://philpapers.org/browse/inquiry.

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Acknowledgements

Thank you to Abdul Ansari, Zach Barnett, Bob Beddor, Jennifer Carr, Jamie Drier, Ying Huang, Anton Johnson, Chris Kelp, Emily Kress, Sam McGrath, Haigen Messerian, Elizabeth Miller, Jared Millson, Luis Rosa, Joshua Schechter, Mona Simion, David Thorstad, Anna Tsvetkov, Peter van Elswyk, Dennis Whitcomb, Chris Willard-Kyle, and Orfeas Zormpalas for helpful conversations and feedback. The paper has benefited from the questions and comments of audience members at the Dissertation Workshop at Brown University (2021), the Southampton-Humboldt Normativity Conference (2021), the Brown Bag Seminar at CONCEPT at the University of Cologne (2022), the Northeast Normativity Workshop at the University of Pennsylvania (2022), the Inquiry Conference at the COGITO Epistemology Research Centre at the University of Glasgow (2022), and the Eastern APA in Montreal (2023); I'm especially grateful to Tez Clark and Kate Nofli for their commentary at the Eastern APA. I would also like to thank two anonymous reviewers from Philosophical Studies for very helpful constructive comments and suggestions. Special thanks to David Christensen for feedback on many earlier drafts of the paper, and for having countless conversations with me about these ideas over the past few years.

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    Arianna Falbo

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Falbo, A. Should epistemology take the zetetic turn?. Philos Stud 180, 2977–3002 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-023-02016-3

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