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Incorporation, Transparency and Cognitive Extension: Why the Distinction Between Embedded and Extended Might Be More Important to Ethics Than to Metaphysics

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Abstract

We begin (Sect. 1) by introducing our readers to the Extended Mind Thesis and briefly discuss a series of arguments in its favour. We continue (Sect. 2) by showing of such a theory can be resisted and go on to demonstrate that a more conservative account of cognition (called Embedded Theory) can be developed. We acknowledge (Sect. 3) a stalemate between these two different accounts of cognition and notice a couple of issues (namely, dimensions of transparency and excess of metaphysics in the debate) that we argue have prevented further progress in the field. To overcome the stalemate, we propose (Sect. 4) to focus on the ethical implications of these theories. We link (Sect. 5) work conducted on the Extended Mind Thesis with contemporary transhumanist research and claim that extended may be ethically preferred over embedded because it is a more progressive and inclusive theory.

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Notes

  1. We would like to note that Sterelny (2010) claimed that the original conditions developed by Clark and Chalmers to enable cognitive extensions were too readily met and could not be used to meaningfully distinguish cases where some sort of cognitive credit needed to be granted to the external artefact from cases where technologies should have counted as parts of someone’s mind (Clowes 2015, p.274). For this reason, Sterelny formulated an addition condition for cognitive extension, which he called entrenchment and personalisation. Building and expanding on Sterelny’s work, Clowes more recently (2015) added a sixth condition to the list, what he calls epistemic possession. Thanks to the anonymous reviewer for pressing this point.

  2. In truth, complementarity themes can also be found in Clark’s (1997) seminal work as well as in Wilson (1994) and Haugeland (1998). So, the above-mentioned claim is a rough approximation, which is nevertheless acceptable for the general narrative of this paper.

  3. https://humaniterations.net/2012/01/06/what-is-anarcho-transhumanism/ [last accessed February 2022].

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Acknowledgements

MF would like to express his appreciation to Innopolis University for generously financing his research. A special and rather large thanks must go to Karola Stotz, John Sutton, David Papineau, Michael Anderson and Julian Kiverstein for their invaluable support through the preparation of this paper. Thanks also to the anonymous reviewers for their sharp comments during the review process. Needless to say, any remaining errors are ours alone.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Humanities and Social Sciences, Universitetskaya St, 1, Innopolis, Republic of Tatarstan, Russia, 420500

    Mirko Farina

  2. Lab of Industrializing Software Production (LIPS), Faculty of Computer Science and Engineering, Universitetskaya St, 1, Innopolis, Republic of Tatarstan, Russia, 420500

    Mirko Farina

  3. Centro Universitario Internazionale, Via Antonio Garbasso, 42 - 52100, Arezzo, AR, Italy

    Andrea Lavazza

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Correspondence to Mirko Farina.

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Farina, M., Lavazza, A. Incorporation, Transparency and Cognitive Extension: Why the Distinction Between Embedded and Extended Might Be More Important to Ethics Than to Metaphysics. Philos. Technol. 35, 10 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-022-00508-4

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