Abstract
With recent advancements in technology and computer science, we have reached a point where we can clearly state that thinking is no longer the exclusive privilege of living minds. Artificial intelligence (AI) can gather and process information in a manner fairly similar or even superior to our thinking process. AI can use this processed information in a reasoning process to make decisions and execute them. However, what makes our mind distinct from AI is the addition of “I,” that is, an entity composed of two mental processes of awareness-based choice selection (ABCS) and discretionary selection of information for attention (DSIA) that are the fundamental core function of decision making and awareness processes, respectively. ABCS allows the coexistence of free will alongside—but unrestrained by—the chain of causality in the decision-making process with the help of awareness. “I” also allows for DSIA, which is a key step in the awareness process. This intertwined process is crucial for our consciousness. Similar to AI, the mind is devoid of any form of self-recognition without awareness. Self-awareness is a collaborative function of “I” and the mind. “I” is instrumental in the sense of self-awareness, but on its own, it is selfless. Additionally, “I” is the heart of the decision-making process. Therefore, AI is missing “I,” a selfless master of the mind.
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I want to thank the insightful comments and feedbacks offered by Dr. Shahriar Shadkhoo and Professor Patrick grim during the preparation of this manuscript.
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Farhadi, A. There is no “I” in “AI”. AI & Soc 36, 1035–1046 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-01136-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-01136-2