Abstract
Manuel Fasko argues for a twofold thesis. First, he shows that, across Berkeley’s writings, there is evidence of a commitment to several different groups of resemblance relation: relations of generic likeness (between two things of the same genus); relations of specific likeness (between two ideas of the same sense modality); and natural resemblance or identity of nature (between ideas of the imagination and the ideas of sense of which they are copies). Second, Fasko argues that the third kind of resemblance relation, natural resemblance or identity of nature, is a necessary and sufficient condition for one thing (an idea of imagination) to represent another (an idea of sensation). Thus, albeit indirectly, Fasko pushes back on Bartha’s thesis that for Berkeley, representation does not depend on resemblance. For Fasko clarifies the necessary and sufficient conditions required for resemblance-based mental representation.
