Notes
Although, in some cases, infanticide, in the form of a painless and quick end to an unavoidably short and painful life may be a morally different issue, albeit still controversial.
Wilkinson does note some concerns regarding impersonal moral principles and different number cases (93–97). However, the extent that such concerns are relevant to a book (and subject matter) mostly concerned with same number cases is limited (3–4).
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Acknowledgments
Many thanks to the anonymous referee and to Ben Saunders for their very useful comments.
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Feeney, O. Parental Planning and New Reproductive Technologies. Res Publica 17, 303–309 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-011-9150-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-011-9150-6