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Notes
It also leaves happiness. I think happiness is a vastly more complicated case. I am attracted to the idea that to be happy about things is to be pleased about them. If this is right, then one can be a hedonistic monist while admitting that “both” happiness and pleasure are ultimate sources of prudential value. I recognize that this is a line of thinking that would require extensive argument. I am currently at work on a project in which I try to develop the needed argument.
I hinted at the difference in fn. 14 on p. 62 of P&GL.
It seems to me that this case illustrates problems for the Crib Test. I agree that I would not want my child to live a life full of conscious indifference to the innocent suffering of others. However, it’s not clear to me that this shows that I think the life would have low prudential value for my child. Perhaps my preferences concerning this life are based on another consideration—I would not want any child of mine to live this sort of life because such a life would be morally bankrupt. I think my comments here apply also to Noah’s example concerning shamelessness. He says that when he applies the Crib Test to a life in which the child is shamelessly indifferent to his own evil deeds, he finds that he does not want that life for his child. I agree. I would not want that life for my child. But again this may be due to the fact that I would not what any child of mine to be shameless in this way. That may reflect my moral scruples, and not my concerns strictly about the child’s welfare. As I said in the book, the Crib Test must be used with caution.
In fact the sin in question is “fabrication”.
Michael mentioned only the last of these.
Although, as of this writing, I cannot find any such passage in print. The most extended discussion appears in my “What is this thing called happiness?” which has not yet been published.
Though I should be quick to admit that it’s possible that B4 is not basic either. We’d have to interview Bob to locate the ultimate source of value in this case.
See “Basic Intrinsic Value” for six marks of basic intrinsic value states. I see that I did not emphasize the idea that basics must have their value “in a completely non-derivative way” in that paper. It’s a serious defect in the paper and the fact that I failed to discuss it may help to explain why Michael was led astray.
References
Feldman, F. (2000) Basic intrinsic value. Philosophical Studies, 99(3), 319–346.
Sumner, W. (2006) Feldman’s hedonism. In R. Feldman, K. McDaniel, J. Raibley, & M. Zimmerman (Eds.), The good, the right, life, and death: essays in honor of Fred Feldman (pp. 83–100). Ashgate: Aldershot.
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Feldman, F. Replies. Philos Stud 136, 439–450 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9043-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-006-9043-2