Skip to main content

Abstract

This paper examines the Scholastic thesis that truth is a transcendental property of being, and its relevance to debates in contemporary analytic philosophy. The paper begins with a brief survey of analytic views about truth. Then, after setting out the Scholastic doctrine of the transcendentals in general, it explains how truth in particular fits into it, with special attention to the Scholastic distinction between logical truth and ontological truth. The paper then considers the light these Scholastic ideas shed on debates about realism and anti-realism, skepticism and conceptual relativism, the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the Augustinian theistic argument from eternal truths, Trinitarian theology, and other controversies.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 139.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. 1.

    In the movie Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade (1989).

  2. 2.

    Cf. Horwich 1990, 17–18. For discussion of yet other possibilities, and of different senses in which philosophers have used the terms for the four just considered, see Kirkham 1992, 54–58.

  3. 3.

    For a basic overview of the main theories, see Part I of Blackburn 2018.

  4. 4.

    Though only more or less. White makes it clear at pages 13–15 that he objects to some of the ways philosophers have used the term “proposition.”

  5. 5.

    All quotations from the Summa are taken from the translation in Thomas Aquinas 1948.

  6. 6.

    The points summarized in this paragraph are often made in manuals of Thomistic metaphysics. Particularly useful is the discussion in Coffey 1970, 32–36.

  7. 7.

    All quotations from De Veritate are taken from the translation in Thomas Aquinas 1994. For the passage referred to in the text, see Volume III, pages 13–16.

  8. 8.

    E.g. see the diagram proposed in Koren 1955, at page 52. My diagram was inspired by Koren’s, but is significantly different.

  9. 9.

    On the thesis that all being is true insofar as it has the potential to be cognized by a human intellect, whether or not it is actually so cognized, see Mercier et al. 1932, 462, and the discussion of Mercier’s views in McCall 1938.

  10. 10.

    For discussion of the attitudes toward PSR of these and other Thomists, see Fitz Gerald 2002.

  11. 11.

    I discuss and defend PSR at greater length in Feser 2014,137–46, and Feser 2019, 74–85.

  12. 12.

    As Kretzmann points out, though Aquinas does not put forward the thesis in his own voice, he does discuss the use others have put it to without seeming to disagree with the thesis itself even when he disagrees with that use (e.g. in De Veritate I.1).

  13. 13.

    For comments on an earlier version of this paper, I thank audience members at the Tenth Annual Aquinas Philosophy Workshop on the theme Aquinas on Knowledge, Truth, and Wisdom at St. Mary’s Campus, Greenville, SC (June 23–27, 2021).

Bibliography

  • Alston, William P. 1996. A realist conception of truth. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aquinas, Thomas. 1948. Summa Theologica. In Five volumes, translated by the fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benziger Bros.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 1994. Truth. In Three volumes, translated by Robert W. Mulligan, James V. McGlynn, and Robert W. Schmidt. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Augustine. 2002. On the trinity, books 8–15, translated by Stephen McKenna. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bacon, Francis. 2002. Of truth, from the essays or counsels civil and moral. In The major works. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blackburn, Simon. 2018. On truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coffey, P. 1970. Ontology or the theory of being. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson, Donald. 1984. On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. In Davidson, inquires into truth and interpretation, 183–198. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Feser, Edward. 2014. Scholastic metaphysics: A contemporary introduction. Heusenstamm: Editiones Scholasticae.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2017. Five proofs of the existence of god. San Francisco: Ignatius Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • ———. 2019. Aristotle’s revenge: The metaphysical foundations of physical and biological science. Neunkirchen: Editiones Scholasticae.

    Google Scholar 

  • FitzGerald, Desmond. 2002. Gilson and Maritain on the principle of sufficient reason. In Jacques Maritain and the many ways of knowing, ed. Douglas A. Ollivant, 120–127. Washington, D.C: Catholic University of America Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frege, Gottlob. 1988. Thoughts. In Propositions and attitudes, ed. Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames, 33–55. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gardeil, H.D. 1967. Introduction to the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, volume IV: Metaphysics. St. Louis: B. Herder.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gurr, John Edwin. 1959. The principle of sufficient reason in some scholastic systems 1750–1900. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Haldane, John. 1993. Mind-world identity theory and the anti-realist challenge. In Reality, representation, and projection, ed. Haldane and Crispin Wright, 15–37. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Harper, Thomas. 1940. The metaphysics of the school, volume I. New York: Peter Smith.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horwich, Paul. 1990. Truth. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kirkham, Richard L. 1992. Theories of truth: A critical introduction. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Koren, Henry J. 1955. An introduction to the science of metaphysics. St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kretzmann, Norman. 1989. Trinity and transcendentals. In Trinity, incarnation, and atonement, ed. Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga Jr., 79–109. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lynch, Michael P. 2001. The nature of truth: Classic and contemporary perspectives. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • McCall, Raymond J. 1938. St. Thomas on ontological truth. The New Scholasticism 12: 9–29.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mercier, Cardinal, et al. 1932. A manual of modern scholastic philosophy, volume I. St. Louis: B. Herder.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peterson, John. 2015. Mind, truth and teleology: An introduction to scholastic philosophy. Heusenstamm: Editiones Scholasticae.

    Google Scholar 

  • Searle, John. 1983. Intentionality: An essay in the philosophy of mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • White, Alan R. 1970. Truth. New York: Anchor Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wippel, John F. 2007. Truth in Thomas Aquinas. In Wippel, metaphysical themes in Thomas Aquinas II, 65–112. Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Edward Feser .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2023 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG

About this chapter

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this chapter

Feser, E. (2023). Truth as a Transcendental. In: Hochschild, J.P., Nevitt, T.C., Wood, A., Borbély, G. (eds) Metaphysics Through Semantics: The Philosophical Recovery of the Medieval Mind. International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées, vol 242. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15026-5_11

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics