Abstract
The epistemological problem of the truth of memory cannot be resolved without establishing a clear distinction between recollection and phantasy. Husserl’s position in this regard is both paradoxical and compelling. It is paradoxical because Husserl repeats his antiskeptical intention many times; but nevertheless in his phenomenology, recollection and phantasy are almost completely identical. Perhaps no philosopher has so radically approached the experience of remembering and the experience of fantasizing as Husserl. But at the same time, the recognition of this fundamental similarity is precisely what allows the phenomenologist to avoid empiricist misunderstandings and thus approach the problem of the distinction between recollection and phantasy in a much more persuasive way than the traditional one. In this paper, I will first try to show how and why Husserl approaches recollection and phantasy. Then I will try to show how it is possible to establish a clear distinction between these two phenomena without misunderstanding the possibility of false memory.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
See, for example, the unbelievable story of Binjamin Wilkomirski (Schacter 2001) or the dramatic story of Donald Thompson (Baddeley 1997, 18). These two shocking stories are interesting because in both cases, a witness in good faith was not able to distinguish his memories from his fantasies (not about a detail, but about a macroscopic event). In fact, stories of this kind are much more widespread than it might seem, so that a specific part of legal and psychological scientific literature is explicitly dedicated to these problems. On this, see in particular the work of Elizabeth Loftus (Loftus and Ketcham 1994; Loftus and Pickrell 1995).
Retention is also a kind of memory, but according to Husserl an incomplete memory. So we can say that recollection is the paradigmatic form of memory.
I would like to thank the reviewer of this paper for his relevant remarks about this point. Actually, there are some texts (see in particular Hua XXIII, Beilage XLIII) in which Husserl seems not to exclude the possibility of considering recount as a form of propositional memory. In text n.15 of Hua XXIII, Husserl establishes an essential distinction between acts of judgment carried out on the basis of a phantasy re-presentation and the reproduction of phantasy judgment acts. This distinction is essential in order to conceive the reproduction of past judgment as an act of memory in the proper sense (even if here the name “recollection” no longer seems appropriate). Finally, if the reproduction of past judgment can be considered memory in the proper sense, we can also consider the possibility of propositional memory. In the fourth chapter of my book (Feyles 2011, 172), starting from this text, I try to show how it is possible to consider recount as an original form of memory from the Husserlian point of view. However, it seems to me that Husserl embarks upon a path, but he does not reach its end. My opinion is that in Husserl’s theory of memory, perceptual memory is privileged too much and the problem of recount as memory is not considered enough.
Even if the concept of semantic memory stems from recent cognitive science, Husserl seems to be aware of the distinction between semantic memory and episodic memory (see in particular Hua XXIII, 336 and 430).
On the difference between recollection and phantasy with regards to their relation to the present, I will say more later (see p.12 and following).
John Brough (2005, XL) rightly notes that memory is less free than perception because it has a lower chance of interaction with its object. While I am perceiving, I can move and look at the object from another angle. In recollection, on the contrary, I have only one determined perspective and I have no possibility to further explore the perceived object. But while the possibility of spatial interaction is lower, the possibility of temporal interaction is higher. In recollection, I can move from one now to another, “skipping” a period of time or synthesizing an episode. The same does not happen in the fixed sequence of perception.
“A priori liegt Vergegenwärtigung eines Erlebnisses im Bereich meiner “Freiheit”” (Hua X, 42).
This “lack of intuitiveness” can also be complete. On this, see text n. 14 of Hua XXIII where Husserl analyzes the possibility of a Leervergegenwärtigung (Hua XXIII, 302).
This was the position of Bartlett (1961).
“Der Unterschied zwischen Wahrnehmungs-und Phantasieauffassung ist kein bloßer Unterschied zweier Gattungen oder Klassen von Inhalten und kann es nicht sein” (Hua XXIII, 100).
Many scientists recognize the difficulties of establishing an objective criterion to distinguish recollection and phantasy in a third person approach. “Psychological science has not yet developed a reliable way to classify memory as true or false” (Loftus 2003, 232).
“Le re-souvenir serait donc, selon la terminologie de Husserl, un “souvenir secondaire” (sekundäre Erinnerung) qui prendrait appui sur le “souvenir primaire” de la rétention” (Bernet 1994, 248).
“Thus we see Husserl, once again, showing that the distinction of recollection over phantasy lies in the context of content surrounding any recollection, the fact that it is embedded in an interwoven stream of perceptually related experiences, while phantasy does not have this context or connection” (Rodemeyer 2010, 244).
On this, Pierre Vermersch (2004, 10–11) is very clear.
On this issue, text n.7 of Husserliana XXIII is very clear. Here, speaking about pure phantasy, Husserl says: “Die Elemente sind noch Erinnerungselemente. Aber das intentionale Ganze ist charakterisiert als “freie Erfindung”, aufgehoben durch den Widerstreit mit gewisser Erinnerung und Wahrnehmung” (Hua XXIII, 250).
“[…] ich Dinge nur einbilden kann nach Formen, die ich einmal schon erfahren haben, ihrem allgemeinsten Typus nach. Ich kann nicht sinnliche Qualitäten nach ihren obersten Gattungen erfinden etc., so wie ich nicht neue Sinne erfinden kann” (Hua XIII, 311).
References
Baddeley, A. (1997). Human memory: theory and practice. Hove: Psychology Press.
Bartlett, F. C. (1961). Remembering: a study in experimental and social psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bernet, R. (1994). L’encadrement du souvenir. In La vie du sujet. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Brough, J. (2005). Translator’s introduction. In: Husserl, E. Phantasy, image consciousness, and memory. Dordrecht: Springer.
Casey, E. (1976). Comparative phenomenology of mental activity: memory, hallucination, and phantasy contrasted with imagination. Research of Phenomenology, 6, 1–25.
Casey, E. (1987). Remembering. A phenomenological study. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Feyles, M. (2011). Studi per la fenomenologia della memoria. Roma: Franco Angeli.
Hua III/1. Husserl, E. (1976). Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. In S. von Karl (Ed.)., Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Hua X. Husserl, E. (1966). In: B. von Rudolf (Ed.)., Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins: 1893–1917. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Hua XI. Husserl, E. (1966). In F. von Margot (Ed.). Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs-und Forschungsmanuskripten, 1918–1926. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Hua XIII. Husserl, E. (1973). In K. von Iso (Ed.). Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Erster Teil. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Hua XXIII. Husserl, E. (1980). In E. Marbach (Ed.). Phantasie, Bildbewusstsein, Erinnerung. Zur Phänomenologie der anschaulichen Vergegenwärtigung. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Husserl, E. (1948). Erfahrung und Urteil. Hamburg: Klassen.
Hume, D. (1987). A treatise on human nature, vol. I. Oxford: Clarendon.
Janet, P. (1928). L’évolution de la mémoire et de la notion du temps, Vol. II: II: La mémoire élémentaire. Paris: A. Chahine.
Loftus, E., & Ketcham, K. (1994). The myth of repressed memory. New York: St. Martin’s Griffin.
Loftus, E., & Pickrell, J. E. (1995). The formation of false memories. Psychiatric Annals, 25, 720–725.
Loftus, E. (2003). Our changeable memories: legal and practical implications. Nature Reviews: Neuroscience, 4(3), 231–234.
Ricoeur, P. (2000). La mémoire, l’histoire, l’oubli. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
Rodemeyer, L. M. (2010). A return to retention and recollection: An analysis of the possible mutual influence of consciousness and its content. In D. Lohmar & I. Yamaguchi (Eds.), On time. New contributions to the Husserlian phenomenology of time. Dordrecht: Springer.
Schacter, D. L. (2001). The seven sins of memory: how the mind forgets and remembers. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Vermersch, P. (2004). Phénoménologie et mémoire 1/ Pourquoi Husserl s'intéresse-t-il tant au ressouvenir? Expliciter, (n.53).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Feyles, M. Recollection and phantasy: The problem of the truth of memory in Husserl’s phenomenology. Phenom Cogn Sci 12, 727–746 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9283-x
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-012-9283-x