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Explaining the Failure of Mexico’s National Commission of Human Rights (Ombudsman’s Office) after Democratization: Elections, Incentives, and Unaccountability in the Mexican Senate

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Abstract

Mexico’s ombudsman’s office (the Comision Nacional de Derechos Humanos (CNDH)), established in 1990 by a nondemocratic government, posed no threat to the then ruling party. Counter to expectations, even after Mexico democratized in 2000, the CNDH remained unwilling to challenge officials for human rights violations. I argue that this is because the ombudsman (the head of the CNDH) is chosen by Mexican Senators who are not accountable—due to secret voting and a prohibition on reelection—to the Mexican public. While civil society wanted a powerful ombudsman, the three main parties did not. Ignoring the public, Senators responded to their parties and appointed a compliant individual to serve as ombudsman, thereby ensuring that the CNDH would not challenge those who held political power. The paper suggests that where accountability institutions, such as human rights offices, are chosen by unaccountable actors (in this case the Mexican Senate), the development of such accountability institutions will be limited.

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Notes

  1. Mainwaring (2003, p. 7) prefers to categorize accountability as “electoral accountability” (the voters) and “intrastate accountability” (for example, legislative committees, congressional hearings, the legal system). Crisp et al. (2003) argue that accountability requires a principal–agent relationship that includes the capacity to sanction, not just oversight.

  2. For details on the titles, establishment, and duties of ombudsmen in the region, see Reif (2004, pp. 188–191).

  3. While the latter was originally unique to the Andean region, as of November 2006 it was given to the Mexican Ombudsman as well.

  4. International organizations, such as the International Ombudsman Institute and the Andean Commission of Jurists, have produced much of this literature. As for scholarly work, Dodson and Jackson (2004) have an article that describes the emergence and early workings of the ombudsman in Guatemala and El Salvador and another that examines the political engagement and public perception of El Salvador’s ombudsman’s office (Dodson et al. 2001).

  5. For example, governments in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras attempted to financially starve their ombudsman’s office to make them compliant (Uggla, 435).

  6. This research uses a nonprobability snowball sample of civil society, including lawyers and academics, researchers at think tanks, initial founders of Mexico’s human rights movement and leaders from the human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) community, and sub-national Mexican ombudsmen.

  7. These early groups included the Centro Francisco de Victoria, the Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez, the Mexican Academy for Human Rights, and the Centro Fray Bartolome de las Casas.

  8. Mexico’s first ombudsman’s office was established at the state level in Aguascalientes in 1988. While that ombudsman could examine complaints, the office’s recommendations were not obligatory. The first ombudsman, Miguel Sarre, resigned when the governor of Aguascalientes refused to uphold a recommendation to fire the Chief of Police for torturing an individual (Sarre, personal interview, 2005).

  9. For example, the leadership of the CNDH limited the office’s own powers by writing internal regulations that proscribed labor and electoral matters from its jurisdiction.

  10. Thereby constitutionally cementing limits on power that the CNDH had earlier written for itself.

  11. Friendly settlements, detailed in articles 119–124 of the CNDH’s internal regulations, may not be used where grave violations of human rights have occurred.

  12. Article 138 of the CNDH’s internal regulations states that “once all real possibility of compliance with the recommendation is exhausted, the case can be closed.”

  13. Article 140 of the CNDH’s internal regulations.

  14. Mayoral and Isabel (2010). See Human Rights Watch’s (2008) Report, footnote 8, page 12, for the CNDH’s annual budgets.

  15. For details on the proposals put forth by the different parties, see Ackerman (2007, pp. 140–145).

  16. The Mexican Academy of Human Rights.

  17. The Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas (IIJ) at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Two of Mexico’s previous ombudsman had also headed the IIJ.

  18. Information on Senate seat distribution: www.cidac.org.

  19. The UN High Commission’s suggested reforms were included in its National Human Rights Program for Mexico (www.gobernacion.gob.mx/comisiondh) presented in December 2004. For an analysis of the program, see Centro Prodh (2004, pp. 4–6 (Winter)).

  20. Article 83 stated that: “Legally constituted nongovernmental organizations may denounce human rights violations before the CNDH on behalf of persons who do not have the capacity to present their complaints directly, because of their mental or physical, economic or cultural circumstances.”

  21. For example, by demanding that their client be present when a “friendly settlement” was reached between a CNDH representative and the authority charged with the abuse (Hernandez, personal interview, Hernández 2005

  22. Article 87 of the CNDH’s internal regulations, published on 29 September 2003.

  23. The CNDH denied requests for information from another think tank, Fundar, which was investigating complaints against Mexico’s penitentiary system and later agreed to supply the information, but only if Fundar paid 93 pesos (about $8) per photocopied page (Pulido, personal interview, 2007).

  24. These reports were presented by Programa Atalaya at ITAM; the Mexican Commission for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights, Centro Prodh, the Mexican Academy of Human Rights, and Catedra UNESCO at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (AMDH, “La CNDH en cuestion,” August/October 2004).

  25. http://www.cidac.org/esp/Datos_Electorales.php

  26. Article 10 of the Law of the CNDH, reformed 26 November 2001.

  27. Red Nacional de Organismos Civiles de Derechos Humanos Todos los Derechos Para Todos, Comisión Mexicana de Defensa y Promoción de Derechos Humanos, Academia Mexicana de Derechos Humanos, Fundar, Programa de Derechos Humanos de la Universidad Iberoamericana, Centro Vitoria, Sin Fronteras, Centro de Derechos Humanos Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez.

  28. Soberanes also received excellent press from La Jornada, but at that time the CNDH was spending US $10,000 a month on advertising with that periodical (Fernandez, personal interview, 2005).

  29. Micaela Aguilar and Juan Manual Oliva

  30. Centro Fray Bartolmé de las Casas

  31. Article 59 of the Mexican Constitution prohibits immediate reelection in both houses of congress.

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  1. Department of Political Science, Loyola Marymount University, One LMU Drive, Suite 4100, Los Angeles, CA, 90045, USA

    Jodi Finkel

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Finkel, J. Explaining the Failure of Mexico’s National Commission of Human Rights (Ombudsman’s Office) after Democratization: Elections, Incentives, and Unaccountability in the Mexican Senate. Hum Rights Rev 13, 473–495 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-012-0233-3

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