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This is a commentary on “Pure experience and disorders of consciousness” by Laura Specker Sullivan.
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Fingelkurts, A.A., Fingelkurts, A.A. Placing pure experience of Eastern tradition into the neurophysiology of Western tradition. Cogn Neurodyn 13, 121–123 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11571-018-9506-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11571-018-9506-0