Abstract
Robert Kane’s libertarian theory of freedom is frequently attacked in the free will literature by the “luck objection”. Alfred Mele’s articulation of the objection is a very influential formulation as it captures the spirit of Kane’s critics and their complaint with Kane’s view. Mele argues that without a contrastive explanation that highlights aspects of the agent their free choices are reducible to luck. I argue that the lack of a contrastive explanation does not establish that there is no explanation for self-forming actions. Building on the explanation that Kane offers in his rebuttal, I claim that there are neglected dimensions to Kane’s view that, when put together, mitigate the force of the objection. These elements are value experiments, teleological intelligibility and liberium arbitrium voluntatis. I claim that through adopting a narrative view of the self, we can place value experiments in a broader teleological framework that allows us to see self-forming choices are not just a matter of luck.
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Notes
It is important to highlight how indeterminism is conceptualized and where it is located. If the indeterminism were placed between our deliberations and the formation of intentions our intentions will often have no connection to our deliberations. If the indeterminism is placed between our intentions and actions we will often not act in the manner we intended. The businesswoman’s choice is the outcome of Kane’s teleological process, which does not conceive of the indeterminism problematically. Kane’s model of choice requires understanding the broader context of the choice agents make in SFAs.
To be clear, contrastive explanations are explanations where the explanandum (fact to be explained) is why x rather than y. X is the “fact” and y is the “foil”. It is the fact that is contrasted with x. An example from the literature constructed by Fred Dretske helps to elaborate this definition. The General turns the key in the ignition of his car and the car explodes. A contrastive explanation asks why turning the key caused the explosion rather than starting the car. The Dretske example is drawn from his discussion of structuring versus triggering causes and their connection with contrastive explanations. I want to make clear I have no commitments to a particular model of contrastive explanations or Dretske’s distinction between triggering and structuring causes. I am only providing a broad definition.
Richard Double argues that if the explanation of the choice is only rational this raises the issue of confabulation because it is possible to create a rational fictitious story of one’s actions retroactively. This is one reason why satisficing reasons are not good enough on their own. See “Libertarianism and Rationality.” Southern Journal of Philosophy, vol. 26, no. 3, 1988, pp. 431–439.
Embedded values are not a feature of a set-will because they become embedded through one’s SFAs. It is because of the conflicting values that the required ambivalence is stirred up in one’s will. I discuss embedded values in section four.
I am not attempting to change the nature of satisficing reasons. They are reasons which rationally explain either choice and causally contribute as inputs to the agent’s choice. What I am claiming is there is a more robust explanation of one’s choice to be made in terms of the additional elements I am discussing in this section
This claim should be seen in the context of SFAs because the inputs to one’s deliberation are causal meaning they flow from the past. It is these casual inputs that form the basis of agent’s decisions in SFAs. The businesswoman will either help the victim or go to her meeting, she will not go to Hawaii. When I say “must” I am saying her choices are constrained by her past at the time of action meaning she cannot do anything. We can break from the past on Kane’s account through making what Kane calls Taoist efforts (Kane 1996: 165–66.)
The meaning of the options and the choices made is understood in terms of the embedded values that are conflicted and creating the ambivalence in our wills.
Marya Schechtman’s narrative account also defines the self as narratively self-constituted and I borrow from her account the individualist twist agents give the values in their life stories. As I know, however, Schectman does not connect her account with discussion on free will or utilize it to defend libertarianism. See Schechtman 2011.
The example was inspired by Susan Wolf and her paper, “Self-Interest and Interest in Selves.” Ethics, vol. 96, no. 4, 1986, pp. 704–720
Just as there is no single end point where we achieve narrative unity, there is no single end that gives us happiness.
It is worth noting what influences Kane is drawing on. Kane has developed valued experiments, based on the American Pragmatist tradition, Soren Kierkegaard and John Stewart Mill. The pragmatists believed that knowledge of fact and value are ineliminably experimental. Kane (2010) admits that his first inspiration for value experiments comes from Kierkegaard and his three stages of life. Each stage of life is open to breaking down and leading to despair. Kane seems to suggest that even though there are different ways of living in Kierkegaard’s philosophy they each might fail to make us satisfied. It is through Mill that he connects free will and value experimentation through Mill’s idea of experiments in living. We can think of value experiments as trying different way of living to acquire knowledge about values.
We have to take into account Kane’s notion of objective worth. Kane uses the example of Alan the Artist to explain objective worth. Alan is an unsuccessful painter with a very wealthy friend. Alan’s wealthy friend arranges for “confederates” to buy Alan’s art for ten-thousand dollars apiece at a local art gallery. Alan falsely believes that his work is being recognized for its merits by art critics. Now imagine a second possible world where Alan is still an artist but his art is actually being recognized for artistic merit. Kane argues that if we consider both worlds side by side and in both worlds Alan believes he is a good artist and dies happy, then the world where he is actually a good artist has objective worth. When agents freely choose their value experiments, it is not relative in the sense that agents are pursuing objectively worthy ways of life. What does follow on Kane’s view is we do not know what ways of life are objectively worthy ways of life a priori. We gain this knowledge through freely chosen value experiments.
The notion of incommensurability Kane discusses is the one Isaiah Berlin discusses in relation to value pluralism. For discussion see Berlin 2002.
I wish to thank a reviewer for their helpful comments on this section and suggesting this example.
In Being and Nothingness Sartre describes a similar sort of phenomenon of the self in a pursuit of the “for-itself”. Sartre writes, “We run toward ourselves and we are- due to this very fact- the being which cannot be united with itself. In one sense the running is void of meaning since the goal is… invented and projected. In another sense we cannot refuse to it that meaning which it rejects since… possibility is the meaning of the For-itself. (202–203). Kane and Sartre have different but interestingly overlapping views of the self which are worth noting. Kane’s view has a Sartrean spirit to it.
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Robert Kane, Neil Campbell, and Kathy Behrendt for reading earlier drafts of this essay and their helpful comments.
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Fiorello, A. Free Will, Values, and Narrative Selfhood. Philosophia 48, 115–132 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00065-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-019-00065-9