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Responsibility, Autonomy, and the Zygote Argument

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Abstract

In this paper I argue that the distinction between moral responsibility and autonomy can illuminate various debates about the Zygote Argument (as well as the Four-Case argument). Having made this distinction, one can see how these (broadly speaking) manipulation arguments are unsuccessful. Building on previous work, I also argue that this distinction can provide a framework for understanding other important work in agency theory, including that of Harry Frankfurt and Gary Watson.

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Acknowledgements

I have benefitted from helpful conversations and comments by Patrick Todd and Derk Pereboom. My work on this paper has been supported by a Grant from the John Templeton Foundation, for which I am very grateful. The views I express here are not necessarily those of the foundation.

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Correspondence to John Martin Fischer.

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Fischer, J.M. Responsibility, Autonomy, and the Zygote Argument. J Ethics 21, 223–237 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-017-9254-0

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-017-9254-0

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