Notes
Following Johannsen, I am going to use the phrases “net negative life” and “life not worth living” interchangeably. If we understand “net negative” as “experiencing more pain than pleasure,” as Johannsen does, then this is tantamount to assuming a certain theory of animal welfare. That theory could be questioned, and perhaps ought to be, at least given the position that Johannsen wants to defend on our duties to wild animals. A desire satisfaction or objective list theory of welfare might serve his aims better. However, I won’t say anything more about this until the very end.
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Fischer, B. Two Challenges to Johannsen on Habitat Destruction. Philosophia 50, 865–873 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00416-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-021-00416-5