Conclusion
While Kripke's original paper on the theory of truth used a three-valued logic, we believe a four-valued version is more natural. Its use allows for possible inconsistencies in information about the world, yet contains Kripke's development within it. Moreover, using a four-valued logic makes it possible to work with complete lattices rather than complete semi-lattices, and thus the mathematics is somewhat simplified. But more strikingly, the four-valued version has a wide, natural generalization to the family of interlaced bilattices. Thus, with little more work, the theory is extended to a broad class of settings. Indeed, a result like Theorem 6.2 would not even be possible to state without the interlaced bilattice machinery. We hope the notion of interlaced bilattice will make apparent further such connections.
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Fitting, M. Bilattices and the theory of truth. J Philos Logic 18, 225–256 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00274066
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00274066