Abstract
I suggest that most discussions of intentional systems have overlooked an important aspect of living organisms: the intrinsic goal-directedness inherent in the behaviour of living eukaryotic cells. This goal directedness is nicely displayed by a normal cell’s ability to rearrange its own local material structure in response to damage, nutrient distribution or other aspects of its individual experience. While at a vastly simpler level than intentionality at the human cognitive level, I propose that this basic capacity of living things provides a necessary building block for cognition and high-order intentionality, because the neurons that make up vertebrate brains, like most cells in our body, embody such capacities. I provisionally dub the capacities in question “nano-intentionality”: a microscopic form of “aboutness”. The form of intrinsic intentionality I propose is thoroughly materialistic, fully compatible with known biological facts, and derived non-mysteriously through evolution. Crucially, these capacities are not shared by any existing computers or computer components, and thus provide a clear, empirically-based distinction between brains and currently existing artificial information processing systems. I suggest that an appreciation of this aspect of living matter provides a potential route out of what may otherwise appear to be a hopeless philosophical quagmire confronting information-processing models of the mind.
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Notes
However, I note that Arnold Schopenhauer's core point about what he termed the “will” presages many of the points I make here Schopenhauer (1819). Schopenhauer correctly saw the error of Kant's key claim that we are wholly and irrevocably separated from the actual physical reality of things—Kant's Ding in sich. According to Schopenhauer, our minds do in fact make direct contact with the actual reality of lifeless physical matter—in the single specific domain of our own bodies. Schopenhauer's convincing if underappreciated argument against Kant provides a philosophical precursor of the biologically-based argument I present here. Unfortunately, Schopenhauer goes one step too far I think by ascribing this “will” to non-living matter as well; by my understanding “will” in his sense is the crucial quality distinguishing the living from the non-living, and "will" is closely allied to what I term nano-intentionality.
I thank Phillip Pettit for pointing out this key difference between the flow-diagram for intentional systems as normally conceived, and the intentionality of living things. A nice analogy is the behavior of a fish or frog captured in a trap—they will adopt the (implicit) goal of “escape”, generate mostly random motoric behaviour to achieve this goal, and repeat until they are free. But “escape” and “freedom” are not goals of evolution or “free-floating rationales” built in by past phylogenetic history. They are rough-and-ready responses to the novel and undesireable situation the individual finds itself in. Pettit suggests the nice term "intra-active intentionality" for this more fluid conception of intentionality.
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Acknowledgments
I thank Daniel Dennett, William D. W. Fitch, Phillip Pettit, Kim Sterelny, Gesche Westphal and an anonymous reviewer for comments and constructive criticisms of an earlier version of this manuscript, and Antonio Damasio for insightful conversations on this topic.
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Fitch, W.T. Nano-intentionality: a defense of intrinsic intentionality. Biol Philos 23, 157–177 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-007-9079-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10539-007-9079-5