Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

On Genic Representations

  • Long Article
  • Published:
Biological Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

A recent debate concerning the representational content of DNA in developmental processes has opposed “dynamicists” and “computationalists.” I review the arguments in favor of a representational interpretation of the role of genes, and show that they are inconclusive. There is a very restricted sense in which genes can be said to represent something, and stronger claims about DNA being a program for the construction of an organism are overstatements. I also show that arbitrariness, taken by representationalists to be a central criterion for identifying representational vehicles, is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition to qualify as a representation. Finally, I propose a relatively new way to define what programs are, which implies that genetic regulatory networks shouldn’t be thought of as being programs. As a consequence, insofar as cognition and development share similar mechanisms, any computational account of cognition should be significantly weakened.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See, e.g., Keijzer (1998, 2001, 2002); Godfrey-Smith (1999); Wheeler and Clark (1999); Wheeler (2001).

  2. See, e.g., Wheeler (2007, p. 391) on how mRNA splicing in eukaryotes makes RNA, not DNA, the locus of representational content. More on this below.

  3. It is actually harder to know precisely whether Keijzer claims that genes are not representations or are better seen as representations. That doesn’t matter since it is the possibility of such a thesis I am interested in.

  4. I use the term “nucleic” instead of “genetic” to include RNA and noncoding regions of DNA.

  5. It is actually not a rule but a pure causal mechanism. A rule would be a representation of that mechanism. But this doesn’t affect the present argument.

  6. See also Kistler (2012): a given structure can be said to have a power that gives it the disposition to represent different things in different contexts.

  7. They don’t mention the difference between protein synthesis and regulation, so I assume they include the noncoding regions as a program.

  8. Provided, of course, that both genes are not degenerate, specifying the same amino acid sequence.

  9. No pun intended.

  10. The similarity between this example and Cummins’ (1996) “autobot” is not accidental: Cummins used it to illustrate his point about the non-arbitrariness of representation.

  11. I leave aside here that Cummins refers specifically to symbols in a “language of thought.”

  12. I am worried, though, that the sheer presence of the template protein might defeat the purpose of representing it. This worry is explored in greater depth below. See also Godfrey-Smith’s (2000b, p. 205) reply to Maynard Smith: genes in this case would be mere “samples.”

  13. This objection is germane to what Sarkar (2000, p. 212) calls “hermeneutical relativity.”

  14. Despite its humorous connotation, the term “spaghetti” currently has the surprising ability to represent a unified property of systems well suited for a dynamical systems approach. Wheeler (2005, p. 271), for instance, used it to describe dynamic neural networks, and Kauffman (1993, p. 420) used it to describe “well-scrambled genomic architectures.”

  15. The same explanatory bet goes on in cognitive science, of course. See, e.g., Wheeler (2001).

  16. The research program seems to already be in motion, yet all kinds of epistemological obstacles and confusions may be holding it back.

  17. Maybe “protein regulation” instead of “gene regulation” should have been the name of the process of regulating protein production. My thought experiment will make this point even more compelling.

  18. Let’s suppose that problems of undesired protein interaction are somehow avoided by special enzymes swimming among the proteins.

  19. This is, for instance, Van Gelder’s (1997) position.

References

  • Chemero A (2000) Anti-representationalism and the dynamical stance. Philos Sci 67:625–647

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chemero A (2009) Radical embodied cognitive science. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Clark A (1997) Being there: putting brain, body, and world together again. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Clark A, Toribio J (1994) Doing without representing? Synthese 101:401–431

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cummins R (1989) Meaning and mental representation. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Cummins R (1996) Representations, targets, and attitudes. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Cummins R, Poirier P (2004) Representation and indication. In: Clapin H, Staines P, Slezak P (eds) Representation in mind: new approaches to mental representation. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 21–40

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Dennett DC (1978) Brainstorms: philosophical essays on mind and psychology. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Dennett DC (1989) The intentional stance. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Dretske FI (1995) Naturalizing the mind. Bradford Books, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Edelman GM, Gally JA (2001) Degeneracy and complexity in biological systems. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 98:13763–13768

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Flament-Fultot M (2013) Causes ultimes et causes prochaines. REPHA 7:61–76

    Google Scholar 

  • Godfrey-Smith P (1999) Genes and codes: lessons from the philosophy of mind? In: Hardcastle VG (ed) Where biology meets psychology: philosophical essays. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 305–331

    Google Scholar 

  • Godfrey-Smith P (2000a) On the theoretical role of “genetic coding.” Philos Sci 67:26–44

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Godfrey-Smith P (2000b) Information, arbitrariness, and selection: comments on Maynard Smith. Philos Sci 67:202–207

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Godfrey-Smith P (2007) Information in biology. In: Hull DL, Ruse M (eds) The Cambridge companion to the philosophy of biology. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 103–119

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Godfrey-Smith P (2009) Darwinian populations and natural selection. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Haugeland J (2000) Having thought: essays in the metaphysics of mind. Harvard University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Kauffman SA (1993) The origins of order: self-organization and selection in evolution. Oxford University Press, Oxford

    Google Scholar 

  • Keijzer FA (1998) Doing without representations which specify what to do. Philos Psychol 11:269–302

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keijzer FA (2001) Representation and behavior. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Keijzer FA (2002) Representation in dynamical and embodied cognition. Cogn Syst Res 3:275–288

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keijzer FA (2003) Self-steered self-organization. In: Tschacher W, Dauwalder J (eds) The dynamical systems approach to cognition: concepts and empirical paradigms based on self-organization, embodiment, and coordination dynamics. World Scientific, Singapore, pp 243–259

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Kelso JAS (1995) Dynamic patterns: the self-organization of brain and behavior. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Kistler M (2012) Powerful properties and the causal basis of dispositions. In: Bird A, Ellis BBD, Sankey H (eds) Properties, powers, and structures: issues in the metaphysics of realism. Routledge, London, pp 119–138

    Google Scholar 

  • Maynard Smith J (1999) Shaping life: genes, embryos and evolution. Yale University Press, New Haven

    Google Scholar 

  • Maynard Smith J (2000) The concept of information in biology. Philos Sci 67:177–194

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Millikan RG (1984) Language, thought, and other biological categories: new foundations for realism. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Millikan RG (1995) Pushmi-pullyu representations. Philos Perspect 9:185–200

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Monod J (1971) Chance and necessity. Knopf, New York

  • Saiz L, Vilar JMG (2006) DNA looping: the consequences and its control. Curr Opin Struct Biol 16:344–350

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sarkar S (1996) Biological information: a skeptical look at some central dogmas of molecular biology. In: Sarkar S (ed) The philosophy and history of molecular biology. Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp 187–231

    Google Scholar 

  • Sarkar S (2000) Information in genetics and developmental biology: comments on Maynard Smith. Philos Sci 67:208–213

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schrödinger E (1944) What is life? Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Smolensky P (1988) On the proper treatment of connectionism. Behav Brain Sci 11:1–74

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stegmann UE (2005) Genetic information as instructional content. Philos Sci 72:425–443

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van Gelder T (1997) Dynamics and cognition. In: Haugeland J (ed) Mind design II: philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 421–450

    Google Scholar 

  • Wheeler M (2001) Two threats to representation. Synthese 129:211–231

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wheeler M (2005) Reconstructing the cognitive world: the next step. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Wheeler M (2007) Traits, genes and coding. In: Matthen M, Stephens C (eds) Philosophy of biology. Elsevier, Amsterdam, pp 369–402

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Wheeler M, Clark A (1999) Genic representation: reconciling content and causal complexity. Brit J Philos Sci 50:103–135

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. SND, Université Paris-Sorbonne/CNRS, Paris, France

    Martin Flament-Fultot

Authors
  1. Martin Flament-Fultot
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Martin Flament-Fultot.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Flament-Fultot, M. On Genic Representations. Biol Theory 9, 149–162 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-014-0172-0

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13752-014-0172-0

Keywords

Search

Navigation