Theory & Event

Living as we do under a government in and for which distortion of fact, dissimulation of purpose and outright mendacity are not only characteristic but matters of adopted and steadily implemented policy, it is understandable that political theorists who think that their calling requires them to intervene in current public affairs (not all political theorists have this commitment) should foreground issues concerning truth and truthfulness. In this perspective, the essays presently under review are unquestionably timely. Moreover, these lamentable characteristics of the present American government are by no means unique, either among previous American governments or among other governments past or present. Thus reflections concerning truth and truthfulness in politics and governance have been and will remain pertinent to praxis-oriented political theorizing always and everywhere. As made clear by the essays to be assessed here, this has been and remains the view of a preponderance of thinkers conventionally regarded as political theorists.

Each in their own way, Elkins, Norris and Zerilli make potent arguments for the unavoidability of issues not only concerning truthfulness but of truth (a distinction that deserves critical attention) in assessing political discourse and practice. Although as a generalization I find these arguments convincing, there are considerations that warrant hesitations and qualifications concerning them. The strongest of the hesitations stem from various versions of skepticism. I cannot do more than sketch the outlines of skeptical hesitations concerning the idea of truth, but doing so may be enough to diminish somewhat confidence in the view that, in politics, truth-seeking –finding and –asserting are appropriate objectives or ideals and that demonstrated failures to achieve or even to honor them, deliberate or not, are sufficient reasons for criticism and perhaps dissent, disobedience or active resistance to governments that evidence such failures.

First, for “Academic” or “dogmatic” skeptics such as Carneades, and arguably for Nietzsche, the idea or ideal of truth stands for a something that cannot be achieved or realized. In Bernard Williams’ distinction, invoked by both Elkins and Norris, truthfulness requires satisfaction of a bi-conditional: first, I must sincerely believe what I say —and second, that there is adequate evidence or argumentation to support my belief that what I say is “accurate” concerning the subjects of my statement. On the radical skeptical view, even if the first condition is satisfied – the second condition, accuracy, can never be fully satisfied. There is always reasonable doubt concerning whether what I say appropriately corresponds to or gives a rational account of the subject matters of my statement. This is an “extreme” view and is disabling of the notion of truth and of truthfulness in so far as the latter is taken to require “accuracy.” Although hard to confute conclusively, I do not find arguments of this type providing sufficient reason to reject the ideas/ideals of truth and truthfulness in politics. In specified circumstances, it can be shown both that I believe what I say and that what I say is warranted, for anyone, by the available evidence or reasoning.

Pyhhronic skepticism a la Sextus Empiricus, Rabelais, Cervantes, Montaigne, Hume in respect to some questions, James, Oakeshott and Wittgenstein offers an alternative perspective on issues concerning truth and truthfulness. There will always be reason to doubt, to question, particular statements and assertions, but in the context of particular language-games and forms of life, there will ordinarily be sufficient reasons to accept them. Focusing on Wittgenstein, Norris effectively develops this view, and Zerilli does so with reference to Arendt.

This, however, is where further hesitations become appropriate and some distinctions become important. The further hesitation stems from the view, often attributed to Arendt, that claims to truth have a chilling or even a stilling effect on political discourse. Truth is tyrananical; if I or others accede to your claim that what you say, report, or propose has the standing of truth, I or they are either silenced or it can be demonstrated that my or their dissent from you is erroneous, irrational or otherwise justifiably dismissed from political discourse. This conception of truth as tyrannical is evidently the view of Montaigne, it is manifest in...