Abstract
Ever since Gilbert Ryle in his Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society in 1945 focused attention on the distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that there has been a lively discussion of this topic. While Ryle argued that knowing-that and knowing-how are two distinct kinds of knowledge, there have been attempts to refute Ryle by showing that all knowledge is knowingthat, or that all knowledge is knowing-how. Also, several intermediate positions have been proposed. Often one discusses only a few uses of these expressions and thinks that these uses are representative of all uses. A main strength of Abel’s contributions is that he avoids these facile generalizations by considering a very wide range of examples. Abel also create some order in this immense multitude of various constructions. I am not discussing his classifications here, but consider only a few selected issues that seem to me to be of particular importance in connection with knowing-how.
