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Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited

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Abstract

A mistake in “Five legitimate definitions of correlated equilibrium (CE) in games with incomplete information” motivates a re-examination of some extensions of the solution concept that Aumann introduced.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. CEREMADE, Université Paris-Dauphine, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75775, Paris cedex 16, France

    Françoise Forges

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  1. Françoise Forges
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Correspondence to Françoise Forges.

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Forges, F. Correlated Equilibrium in Games with Incomplete Information Revisited. Theor Decis 61, 329–344 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-9005-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-006-9005-3

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