Conclusions
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1.
Theism can be defended against the Philosophical Problem of Evil, provided one rejects the Principle of Perfectionism, without relying on the Greater Good Defence or, unless one is a libertarian, the Free-Will Defence.
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2.
A corollary of the All Good Possible Worlds Defence and the No Best Possible World Defence, is that God’s goodness need not determine God’s choice to create. The reasons, if any, which God has are relevant to the Theological Problem of Evil but not to the Philosophical Problem of Evil.
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References
Julian Wolfe, ‘Divine Perfection’, {jtSophia} Vol. {vnXIV}. {snNo. 3} October, {dy1975}.
Richard R. La Croix, ‘Ujustified Evil and God’s Choice’, {jtSophia} Vol. {vnXIII}. {snNo. 1}. April {dy1974}.
This defence is inspired by Leibniz’ philosophy. Every monad is a world in my sense and Leibniz’ Best of All Possible Worlds corresponds to the totality of all good possible worlds.
Here I speak as a soft determinist.
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Forrest, P. The problem of evil: Two neglected defences. SOPH 20, 49–54 (1981). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02782747
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02782747