Abstract
How should we understand the familiar demand that journalists ‘be objective’? One possibility is that journalists are under an obligation to report only the facts of the matter. However, facts need to be interpreted, selected, and communicated. How can this be done objectively? This paper aims to explain the concept of journalistic objectivity in methodological terms. Specifically, I will argue that the ideal of journalistic objectivity should be recast as a commitment to John Rawls’s conception of public reason. Journalism plays a vital role in the operation of all modern liberal democracies, functioning as the public watchdog, the fourth estate, or the conduit through which vital information flows to the citizenry. Journalism is, therefore, an institution that is best understood as part of the basic structure of society. In Political Liberalism, Rawls explicitly excludes media of any kind from the demands of public reason because he doesn’t think that they play a political role that is important enough to bring them under the official auspices of public reason. I will argue that overlooking the political significance of journalism is a mistake, but one that can be corrected while keeping within the spirit and most important elements of his theory. This revision will widen the scope for what counts as journalism beyond traditional outlets and forms of media but will impose the demands of public reason on anyone who intends to participate in the institution.
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Notes
For the purposes of this essay I take ‘liberal democratic societies’ to correspond closely to Robert Dahl’s definition of polyarchies (Dahl 1989, p. 220), which are characterised by, among other things, inclusive suffrage, free and fair elections, freedom of expression and the right to seek out alternative sources of information. For the purposes of this essay I will focus solely on liberal democratic societies as here defined.
See Christians et al. (2009, Chs. 5 & 10) for a more in-depth treatment of media roles. In particular they have some interesting things to say about the commercial and radical responsibilities of the media. I will discuss the radical role in the section devoted to objections.
For example, choosing between competing elites, as Schumpeter (1966) conceived of the role of the electorate in modern democracies, all the way through to more demanding republican theories of active citizenship and participatory democracy.
We rely on journalists to keep our politicians and other public figures honest. We also rely on them to shine a light on mistakes and to demand the whole story when things go wrong. Elections are infrequent and by necessity raise primarily general issues, whereas government-appointed inquiries and ombudsmen lack the reach, independence, and immediate impact of the traditional media. Between elections and, indeed, during election campaigns, the media asks questions on our behalf and gives voice to general concerns. Finally, access to quality sources of information underpins many of the reasons for supporting a democratic system. An ignorant or misinformed citizenry cannot be expected to make sensible decisions or to contribute positively to the quality of decisions that are made.
In discussing Rawls’s views on public reason I will focus mainly on Lecture VI of Political Liberalism and The Idea of Public Reason Revisited as these are the fullest expressions of his ideas. On some issues his views change, and where this is relevant I will give priority to The Idea of Public Reason Revisited as Rawls himself held this to be the best statement of his position. See Rawls (2005, pp. 437–439).
See Rawls (2005, pp. 54–58) for a more complete account.
We can add to these our place in the historical timeline, swept along by the Habermasian evolution of economic, social, and political trends. See Habermas (2008) for a subtle discussion of the historical development of a public sphere inspired by Enlightenment ideals.
He holds that the quality of reasonableness is expressed by ‘a willingness to propose fair terms of social cooperation that others as free and equal also might endorse, and to act on these terms, provided others do so, even contrary to one’s own interest’ (Rawls 1995, p. 134).
See Rawls (2005, p. 137) for a statement of the liberal principle of legitimacy.
Rawls discusses how strictly the ideal of public reason should be applied (Rawls 2005, p. 247), whether we should adopt an ‘exclusive’ or an ‘inclusive’ strategy, either disallowing all reference to one’s comprehensive doctrine or permitting them when certain social and historical conditions necessitate strength of conviction to motivate action which might not otherwise occur. His examples include the abolition of slavery in the United States, where appeals to comprehensive values provided the means for positive social change. When there are specific injustices that can be illustrated and demonstrated in accordance with public reason but public reason itself is insufficient to mobilise the widespread support necessary to make the required changes then it is acceptable to couch justifications in comprehensive terms and in accordance with specific comprehensive values. This conclusion is compatible with the broader process of reflective equilibrium and I raise it here in order to show that the role of public reason is, in these cases, to stand as an ideal which we strive to approximate in our behaviour. See also Rawls (2005, pp. 462–466) where he discusses the wide view of public political culture and the importance of demonstrating that one’s comprehensive doctrine supports the foundational political values.
The duty of civility is ‘to be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason’ Rawls (2005, p. 217).
That is, in a narrower sense than the role it plays in the legitimation of coercive power in Rawls’s scheme.
This thought is substantially borrowed from Thomas Nagel’s (1986) approach to objectivity which identifies considered abstraction as a path to reducing subjectivity. Perspectives can be thought of as more objective as they become less subjective.
BBC Editorial Guidelines. http://www.bbc.co.uk/guidelines/editorialguidelines/page/guidance-financial-full. Accessed 26 June 2013.
Even minimalistic understandings such as Schumpeter’s theory of competing elites (Schumpeter 1966) adhere to a role for the polity that is impossible in the absence of an extensive network of communication and information.
Without doubt, there remains a critical role for large and well-resourced news organisations, but the structures and trappings of such institutions do not by themselves prevent such movements as citizen journalism, online in particular, from claiming the mantle of journalism proper.
My thanks to an anonymous referee for helping me to clarify the space that the media occupies in the nonpublic political culture.
See (Rawls 2005, pp. 220–223) for more detail on nonpublic reasons.
Without presenting an exhaustive list, there are five obvious areas that a political conception of journalism must cover: (1) Debates about enacting or reforming legislation; (2) the implementation and regulation of legislation; (3) pervasive social problems; (4) economic affairs; (5) international relations.
My thanks to Joe Saunders for pushing me on this point.
My thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing me on this point.
I am thinking of the extra evidential weight that is given to journalists’ notes. In the United States, many states also have shield laws that allow journalists to protect sources when it is in the public interest.
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Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Jimmy Lenman, Helena Sheehan, and Daniel Viehoff for invaluable supervision and advice, and the University of Sheffield for funding my research. I am also extremely grateful to Jessica Begon for detailed comments, and to all those who attended the University of Sheffield Philosophy Postgraduate Summer Seminar Series for helpful discussion and suggestions. Finally, I would like to thank the referees and editor of Res Publica for their comments and assistance.
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Fox, C. Public Reason, Objectivity, and Journalism in Liberal Democratic Societies. Res Publica 19, 257–273 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-013-9226-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-013-9226-6