Abstract
Carl Hempel introduced what he called “Craig’s theorem” into the philosophy of science in a famous discussion of the “problem of theoretical terms.” Beginning with Hempel’s use of ‘Craig’s theorem,” I shall bring out some of the key differences between Hempel’s treatment of the “problem of theoretical terms” and Carnap’s in order to illuminate the peculiar function of Wissenschaftslogik in Carnap’s mature philosophy. Carnap’s treatment, in particular, is fundamentally anti-metaphysical—he aims to use the tools of mathematical logic to dissolve rather solve traditional philosophical problems—and it is precisely this point that is missed by his logically-minded contemporaries such as Hempel and Quine.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Birkhoff G., von Neumann J.: The logic of quantum mechanics. Annals of Mathematics 37, 823–843 (1936)
Carnap, R. (1934). Logische Syntax der Sprache (Wien: Springer); translated as The logical syntax of language. London: Kegan Paul, 1937.
Carnap, R. (1936). Von der Erkenntnistheorie zur Wissenschaftslogik. In Actes du Congrès international de philosophie scientifique, fasc. 1: Philosophie scientifique et empirisme logique (pp. 36–41). Paris: Hermann.
Carnap R.: Foundations of logic and mathematics. In: Neurath, O., Carnap, R., Morris, C.(eds) International encyclopedia of unified science (Vol I)., pp. 139–213. University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1939)
Carnap, R. (1950). Empiricism, semantics, and ontology. Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 11, 20–40 (Reprinted in Carnap, 1956, pp. 205–229).
Carnap R.: Meaning and necessity (2nd enlarged ed). University of Chicago Press, Chicago (1956)
Carnap R.: The methodological character of theoretical concepts. In: Feigl, H., Scriven, M.(eds) Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, vol I: The foundations of science and the concepts of psychology and psychoanalysis., pp. 38–76. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis (1956)
Carnap, R. (1963). Replies and systematic expositions. In P. Schilpp (Ed.), The philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (pp. 859–1013). La Salle: Open Court.
Carnap R.: Philosophical foundations of physics: An introduction to the philosophy of science. Basic Books, New York (1966)
Carnap R.: An introduction to the philosophy of science. Basic Books, New York (1974)
Craig W.: On axiomatizability within a system. Journal of Symbolic Logic 18, 30–32 (1953)
Craig W.: Replacement of auxiliary expressions. Philosophical Review 65, 38–55 (1956)
Demopoulos W.: Carnap on the rational reconstruction of scientific theories. In: Friedman, M., Creath, R.(eds) The Cambridge companion to Carnap., pp. 248–272. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2007)
Friedman M.: Carnap and Quine: Twentieth-century echoes of Kant and Hume. Philosophical Topics 34, 35–58 (2006)
Friedman M.: Introduction: Carnap’s revolution in philosophy. In: Friedman, M., Creath, R.(eds) The Cambridge companion to Carnap, pp. 1–18. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2007)
Hempel C.G.: The theoretician’s dilemma: A study in the logic of theory construction. In: Feigl, H., Scriven, M., Maxwell, G.(eds) Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, vol II: Concepts, theories and the mind-body problem., pp. 37–98. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis (1958)
Hempel C.G.: Implications of Carnap’s work for the philosophy of science. In: Schilpp, P.(eds) The philosophy of Rudolf Carnap., pp. 685–709. Open Court, La Salle (1963)
Psillos S.: Scientific realism: how science tracks truth. London & New York, Routledge (1999)
: Rudolf Carnap’s theoretical concepts in science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 31, 151–172 (2000)
Quine, W. V. (1948). On what there is. Review of Metaphysics, 2, 21–38 (Reprinted from From a logical point of view, pp. 1–19, by Quine, Ed., 1953).
Quine, W. V. (1951). Two dogmas of empiricism. Philosophical Review, 60, 20–43 (Reprinted from From a logical point of view, pp. 20–46, by Quine, Ed., 1953).
Quine W.V.: From a logical point of view. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass (1953)
Quine W.V.: Carnap and logical truth. In: Schilpp, P.(eds) The philosophy of Rudolf Carnap., pp. 385–406. Open Court, La Salle (1963)
Quine, W. V. (1970). Philosophy of logic. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall
Van Fraassen B.C.: The scientific image. Clarendon Press, Oxford (1980)
Zabell, S. L. (2007). In M. Friedman & R. Creath (Eds.), Carnap on probability and induction (pp. 273–294).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Friedman, M. Wissenschaftslogik: The role of logic in the philosophy of science. Synthese 164, 385–400 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9356-0
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-008-9356-0