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Alexander, Joshua. Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction

Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2012. 154pp. Paperback, $22.95, ISBN 978–0745649184

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Notes

  1. Alexander apologizes for having to leave out recent experimental work on consciousness and some other big issues. He provides further reading (e.g., Gray et al. 2007; Knobe and Prinz 2008; Arico 2010; Huebner et al. 2010; Sytsma and Machery 2010; Arico et al. 2011). An undergraduate syllabus would want to add the work of Doris (1998, 2002), Haidt (2001) and Greene (2003, 2008).

  2. These quotations are culled from Knobe and Doris (2010).

  3. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tt5Kxv8eCTA and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sHoyMfHudaE

  4. “Against Intuition,” Christopher Shea, The Chronicle of Higher Education, October 3, 2008.

  5. “Philosophy’s Great Experiment,” David Edmonds, Prospect Magazine, March 1, 2009.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point, WI, USA

    David J. Frost

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Frost, D.J. Alexander, Joshua. Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction . Philosophia 40, 903–917 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-012-9392-3

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