Abstract
Richard Penny argues that Rawls’s commitment to self-respect puts him at odds with his endorsement of unequalizing incentives. Penny draws on G.A. Cohen’s distinction between ‘lax’ and ‘strict’ readings of the difference principle to make this point. Given this, Penny concludes that Rawls faces a dilemma: either Rawls weakens his endorsement of unequalizing incentives or weakens his commitment to self-respect. By taking the difference principle in isolation, Penny creates a false dilemma. I will argue that once we place the difference principle in the context of Rawls’s theory as a whole, we find that unequalizing incentives pose no danger to the self-respect of the least advantaged. Moreover, I will argue that a strict reading of the difference principle is incompatible with the self-respect of all citizens in a well-ordered society given the fact of reasonable pluralism. My arguments reveal the importance of seeing self-respect as a threshold good, rather than a relative one.
Notes
Joshua Cohen discusses what he calls the ‘ultralax’ reading to make this point (Cohen 2001, pp. 365–372). The ‘ultralax’ reading takes all preferences as fixed in evaluating what makes an incentive necessary, rather than merely self-interested preferences.
Patrick Tomlin makes a similar objection to this move when considering the effects of inequality on envy, which relates to self-respect (Tomlin 2008, p. 110).
References
Cohen, G.A. 2008. Rescuing justice and equality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Cohen, Joshua. 2001. Taking people as they are? Philosophy & Public Affairs 30: 363–384.
Penny, Richard. 2013. Incentives, inequality and self-respect. Res Publica 12: 335–341.
Rawls, John. 1999a. A theory of justice: Revised edition. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John. 1999b. The law of peoples: With, the idea of public reason revisited. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John. 2001. Justice as fairness: A restatement, ed. Erin Kelly. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Rawls, John. 2005. Political liberalism: Expanded edition. New York: Columbia University Press.
Tomlin, Patrick. 2008. Envy, facts and justice: A critique of the treatment of envy in justice as fairness. Res Publica 14: 101–116.
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Michael Kates and George Klosko for their comments and encouragement.
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Frye, H.P. Putting Incentives in Context: A Reply to Penny. Res Publica 21, 93–98 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-014-9263-9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-014-9263-9