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Humanity of the Human and the Politics of Vulnerability

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Vulnerabilities

Part of the book series: Integrated Science ((IS,volume 18))

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Abstract

What I propose is to explicit the relationship between two dimensions, which, in my opinion, are inseparable from any discourse about vulnerability. On the one hand, the horizon of politics and institutions, the horizon of practice; on the other, that relative to the definition of the ‘humanity of the human’, the theoretical horizon. To talk about the ‘politics of vulnerability’, we need to understand what is meant by vulnerability and the dimensions it implies. In this particular case, I want to discuss two philosophers who found a way to keep these two dimensions together, namely, Judith Butler and Simone Weil. The thesis I would like to arrive at could be articulated in the following points: (1) vulnerability is ‘constitutive’ of the humanity of the human; (2) vulnerability also stems from certain discourses of power; (3) to accept vulnerability as the common trait of humanity can be the basis upon which to construct a nonviolent or least violent possible coexistence; (4) in order to arrive at this, the philosophical and political problems to be addressed are ‘attention for’ and ‘recognition’ of vulnerability, and this implies circumstances where vulnerability is not obvious or is not recognised as such.

There is in each human being something sacred. But it is not his person, which is not anything more than his personality. It is him, this man, wholly and simply.

There is a passerby in the street who has long arms, blue eyes, a mind where thoughts are swirling that I know nothing about, but that may well be nothing special.

It is neither his person nor his personality that is sacred to me. It is him. Him as a whole. Arms, eyes, thoughts, everything. I would not violate any of this without infinite scruples

Simone Weil, Human Personality, 1943

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Notes

  1. 1.

    One of the reasons why this issue has not been adequately explored is because confronted with the malheur, as Simone Weil says, recoiling is the spontaneous response: “Thought revolts from contemplating affliction, to the same degree that living flesh recoils from death. A stag advancing voluntarily step by step to offer itself to the teeth of a pack of hounds is about as probable as an act of attention directed towards a real affliction, which is close at hand, on the part of a mind which is free to avoid it” [2, p. 85].

  2. 2.

    However, in the malheur there is something ‘inassumable’, as Levinas argued about suffering: “Suffering is, of course, a datum in consciousness, a certain ‘psychological content,’ similar to the lived experience of color, sound, contact, or any other sensation. However, in this very ‘content’ it is an in-spite-of consciousness, the unassumable. The unassumable and ‘unassumability’” [3, p. 91]. About Levinas’ philosophy see [4].

  3. 3.

    It is no coincidence that Levinas strongly proclaims the uselessness of all suffering: “Thus, the least one can say about suffering is that, in its own phenomenality, intrinsically, it is useless: ‘for nothing.’ Doubtless this depth of meaninglessness that the analysis seems to suggest is confirmed by empirical situations of pain, in which pain remains undiluted, so to speak, and isolates itself in consciousness, or absorbs the rest of consciousness” [3, p. 93]. I focused on this issue in [5].

  4. 4.

    The question of the relationship between subjectivity, power and vulnerability is the core of [7].

  5. 5.

    We have seen during the Covid 19 pandemic, how the concept of ‘obligation to the other’ has been used by all governments that have decided to practice policies of restricting freedom and lock down. The issue of obligation, in that case, is intertwined with that of community and immunity. To clarify these issues, the work of Roberto Esposito is indispensable: see [9, 10].

References

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Fulco, R. (2023). Humanity of the Human and the Politics of Vulnerability. In: Achella, S., Marazia, C. (eds) Vulnerabilities. Integrated Science, vol 18. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-39378-5_3

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