Abstract
Bernard Williams has argued that, because belief aims at getting the truth right, it is a conceptual truth that we cannot directly will to believe. Manyothers have adopted Williams’ claim that believers necessarily respect truth-conducive reasons and evidence. By presenting increasingly stronger cases, I argue that, on the contrary, believers can quite consciously disregard the demand for truth-conducive reasons and evidence. The irrationality of those who would directly will to believe is not any greater than that displayed by some actual believers. So, our inability to directly will to believe is a contingent truth (at best).
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Funkhouser, E. Willing Belief and the Norm of Truth. Philosophical Studies 115, 179–195 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025094823262
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025094823262