Abstract
In this paper, I explore some problems faced by those who endorse what I will call strong divine sovereignty (SDS). According to this view, every worldly event is guaranteed by God’s causal activity. The first problem this view faces is that it seems to make God morally blameworthy. I explore several possible ways for defenders of SDS to avoid this conclusion. Unfortunately, however, each of these solutions leaves another problem intact: if SDS is true, then it appears that God is not much like a loving parent, as many have thought. I explore a number of options to avoid this conclusion, arguing that some fail and others include significant costs.
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Notes
There is debate concerning whether there is some freedom-relevant difference between natural determinism and God’s guaranteeing everything that occurs. McCann (2012) argues that freedom is consistent with the latter but not the former, while Vicens (2012) argues that these are more similar than is sometimes supposed.
For a discussion of divine concurrence, see Freddoso (1991).
See Rogers (2003), 374.
Emphasis on the radical difference between human and divine action has support from the long Thomist tradition and has found recent support from Hugh McCann, who attempts to utilize this distinction in a defense of the plausibility of various aspects of SDS. See McCann (2012).
The question of whether the damned would be better off if they didn’t exist has a long history. For an overview of a number of historical discussions of whether or not this is so, see Hoffmann (2013).
Some may argue that no human parent could ensure such a thing while preserving his son’s moral autonomy. Discussing this view is beyond the scope of this paper, and those who think that a human parent could not do such a thing may alter the example to remove any hint of determinism originating from a natural source.
I am grateful to an anonymous referee for stressing this point.
For discussions of personal identity and temporal parts, as well as a discussion of the worm account (if not an endorsement of it), see Sider (2001).
One might go even further and say that the greatest good for any individual is carrying out God’s plan, even if this involves damnation. Some have suggested that our love for God should be so great that we would willingly sacrifice everything, even salvation, for the pleasure of God (De Liguori 1888). Even if we should be willing to make such a sacrifice, the point remains that it would still be a sacrifice, precisely because our own good would surely not involve damnation.
I am grateful to the Classical Theism Project, funded by the John Templeton Foundation, for a grant that enabled me to work on this project. I would also like to thank several anonymous referees for their insightful feedback.
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Furlong, P. Blameworthiness, Love, and Strong Divine Sovereignty. SOPHIA 56, 419–433 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-016-0530-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-016-0530-4