Journal of the History of Philosophy

318 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY But, as I have already suggested,the fact of there being a simple image of extension simply covers over the apparent contradiction facing Locke, and in a far from satisfactoryway. It leaves it quite unexplained. ROGER WOOLHOUSE University o/ York, England SANTAYANA MARGINALIA oN ROYCE'S THE WORLD AND THE INDIVIDUAL The following,in edited form, are the marginal comments George Santayana entered in his own copy of Josiah Royce's magnum opus, The World and the Individual (two vols., 1899). Both annotated volumes are preserved in Robbins Library of Philosophy at Harvard. I would like herewith to express my gratitude to the Harvard philosophy depat'tment for allowing me access to this material for purposes of publication. Santayana's comments are profuse and, almost without exception, clearly legible. I have omitted mere textual underlinlngs and occasional question-marks and exclamation points. In addition, I have left out a large number of brief paraphrasings of textual material, including here only those which seem of special interest because of their succinctness or, on occasion, their tendentiousness. I have included all critical commentary that I was able to make even barely intelligible in context. It was my intention to quote sufficiently from the Royce text in order to provide the reader with minimal frames of reference. It would be helpful, however, to follow Santayana's comments with a copy of The World and the Individual in hand. Perhaps the concluding passage of Santayana's criticalappraisal of Royce as thinkor and person in Character and Opinion in the United States best suggests the spiritwhich pervades the marginalia: His was a gothic or scholastic spirit, iment on devising and solving puT~les, and honouring God in systematic works, like the coral insect or the spider; eventually creating a fabric that in its homely intricacy and fulness arrested and moved the heart, the web of it was so vast, and so full of mystery and yearning. PETER FUSS University oJ Missouri, St. Louts not under a minute, or sixty seconds" (a letter from Molyneux to Locke, Dublin, March 16921693 , Locke's Works, 10 vols., 10th ed. [London, 1801], ix, 310). Locke replied that he had "meant a minute, but by a mistake called a sixtieth of a degree a second" (a letter from Locke to Molyneux, London, 28 March, 1693, Works, ix, 314). Elsewhere ("An examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of seeing all things in God," Works, ix, 216) he says that "few eyes can perceive an object less than thirty minutes of a circle, whereof the eye is the ~ntrc." NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 319 The World and the Individual Volume I LEe'tORE I: The Religious Problems and the Theory of Being At the outset of this lecture, Santayana outlines and comments on Royce's three conceptions of natural religion as follows (pp. 3-4): "I. Nature to God, argument from design. 2. Religion an expression of human feeling. 3. Metaphysics of the Absolute [Is this religion? Yes, if the heart has already pronounced the absolute to be good, but not otherwise]." On page 8, Royce writes: "Now it chances to be a truth of metaphysics, as it is an experience of religion, that just when you are most individual, most alone, as it were, in your personal thinking, about ultimate and divine matters, you are most completely one with the universal Spirit of Truth .... It is then your personal process of thinking that secures your relation to the Reality." Santayana comments: "N.B. Royce's religious isolation Spirit of truth----heartsearching sincerity." At page 13, Royce, in discussing the ontological predicate in the context of religion, notes that a substantial portion of the theological tradition insists upon our knowledge merely that God is, without insisting on our ability to know what he is. Royce adds that while this distinction seems irrational, there are nevertheless reasons for making it. Santayana: "To say an unknowable God /s may be significant [when we discover that Being = Deity]." Pages 23-24, Royce writes: "In brief, an idea, in my present definition may, and, as a fact always does, if you please, appear to be representative of a fact existent beyond itself. But...