Abstract
The paper proposes a solution to the problem of counterfactuals, building on both Rescher’s epistemic and Tichý’s semantic approaches. The core of the proposed solution is the thesis that when expressing a true counterfactual, the speaker assumes a set of background indicative premises as an implicit parameter. When added tacitly to an unreal antecedent, these premises entail the consequent logically or analytically. We draw a distinction between a potentially unreal and an absolutely unreal condition expressed in the antecedent. We view counterfactuals with a positive time vector and an absolute unreal condition as abbreviated deductive retrodictions. Similarly, we consider counterfactuals with a potentially unreal condition to be abbreviated deductive predictions. In a similar manner, we also explain the truth (falsity) of vacuously true counterpossibles or counterpossible conditionals. In the second part, we discuss the enigmatic backtracking counterfactuals. We propose that their negative time direction is due to their being abductive retrodictions, i.e., explanations of unreal effects based on possible causes in which the conditions remain tacit or unexpressed. The backtracking temporal direction of counterfactual abductive retrodictions is in accordance with the thesis on the positive temporal direction from cause to effect. Thus, we demonstrate that in order to explain backtracking counterfactuals, there is no need to assume violations of laws of nature or a special logic. What we need to do is to take into account the third parameter, i.e., a set of tacit or unexpressed additional propositions, as well as the principle of ceteris paribus as the background.
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Notes
Rescher (2007, p. 175).
Rescher (2007, p. 74).
In this paper, absolute unrealness is only related to causality.
The paper, “General Propositions and Causality” was written in 1929 and published posthumously.
“It is not true that if it were true that …, then it would not be true that…”.
Tichý investigates a more adequate notation of events in (Tichý (1980)).
For open propositional constructions, Tichý suggested preserving the lambda binding of variables: λw λt. A╞B. Duží et al. (2010, 414ff.) analyse cases such as these.
Walters (1961, p. 43) believes that the use of the conditional mood in an implicational statement indicates that the statement is an argument.
Examples are taken from Sendłak (2021, 7283).
An overview of the different explanations proposed can be found in Sendłak (2021).
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Funding was provided by by the Science Grant Agency VEGA (Grant No. 1/0197/20) and the Slovak Research and Development Agency (Grant No. APVV-17-0057).
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Gahér, F. Counterfactuals and Backtracking Counterfactuals. Axiomathes 32 (Suppl 2), 553–573 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-022-09618-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-022-09618-2