Abstract
In response to Robert Young's critical comments concerning Hermeneutics and Education I clarify two issues. First, I suggest that a more detailed account of interpretation and learning could be developed in a hermeneutically informed cognitive psychology. This would be an account that escapes the textual model of silent reading construed as private mental experience, and that acknowledges the social and communicative dimensions of understanding. Second, in contrast to Young's view, I contend that phronesis is not reducible to a set of inner thought processes and that it has a role to play even in a critical social theory of education.
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Gallagher, S.: 1992, Hermeneutics and Education, Albany, State University of New York Press.
Gallagher, S.: In press, “Hermeneutical Approaches to Educational Research,” in Helmut Danner and Philip Higgs (eds.) Hermeneutics in Educational Discourse, South Africa, Butterworths.
Gallagher, S.: Forthcoming, “Hegel, Foucault, and Critical Hermeneutics,” in S. Gallagher (ed) Hegel, History, and Interpretation, Albany, SUNY Press.
Ingram, D.: 1987, Habermas and the Dialectic of Reason. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Thompson, J.B.: 1981, Critical Hermeneutics: A Study in the Tought of Paul Ricoeur and Jürgen Habermas. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Young, R.: 1990, A Critical Theory of Education: Habermas and Our Children's Future. New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University.
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Gallagher, S. Extension and critique: A response to Robert Young. Studies in Philosophy and Education 15, 323–328 (1996). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00368489
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00368489