How Law Replaced Morals

Subscibe in publisher´s online store Share via email
How Law Replaced Morals

A Kantian Contribution

Campos Galuppo, Marcelo

From the journal ARSP Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Volume 102, June 2016, issue 2

Published by Franz Steiner Verlag

article, 10811 Words
Original language: English
ARSP 2016, pp 202-221
https://doi.org/10.25162/arsp-2016-0010

Abstract

Although most scholars try to conceive Immanuel Kant’s Theory of Law and his Moral Theory as belonging to a System, there is a difficulty that challenges most of the interpreters: If there is a moral content that informs how positive Law should be enacted, and hence if Morals could evaluate Law, why does Kant say that civil disobedience and resistance to Law cannot rationally be allowed? This apparent incongruence acquires another significance when one considers the functional and structural differences that Kant establishes between Law and Morals. If we take them seriously into account, we will realize that Kant operates a radical separation between Morals and Law, which can no longer derive its content from Morals, but instead looks for an increasingly more political foundation in Modernity.

Author information

Marcelo Campos Galuppo

References

  • 1. Arendt, Hannah The Human Condition 248. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998.
  • 2. Netto, Menelick de Carvalho , Da responsabilidade da administracao pela situacao falimentar de empresa privada economicamente viavel por inadimplencia ou retardo indevido da satisfacao de valores contratados como contraprestacao por obras realizadas. Revista da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil, 63 (XXVI) (jul./dec. 1996).
  • 3. Descartes, Rene Meditations. New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1954.
  • 4. Ellingsen, Mark , The Two Kingdoms in America. Dialog: A Journal of Theology, 4 (45) (Winter 2006).
  • 5. Gueroult, Martial Gueroult Descartes selon L’Ordre des Raison: I - L’ame et Dieu. Paris: Aubier, 1999.
  • 6. Habermas, Jürgen Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to the Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge: MIT, 1996.
  • 7. Herrera, Larry , Kant on Moral Tribfeder. Kant Studien (91), (2000) 395 to 410, Access at https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/de-gruyter/kant-on-the-moral-triebfeder-VQaO0c0Y0Q (02/10/2015).
  • 8. Hobbes, Thomas Hobbes Leviathan. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968, p. 190.
  • 9. Hoffe, Otfried Introduction a la philosophie pratique de Kant: La morale, le droit e la religion. 2nd ed. Paris: Vrin, 1993.
  • 10. Kant, Immanuel The Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of the Metaphysic of Morals. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964.
  • 11. Kant, Immanuel , “Die Metaphysik der Sitten (Tugendlehre)”, In: Kant, Immanuel. Die Metaphysik der Sitten. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkampf, 1977 (TL, A, 31).
  • 12. Kant, Immanuel , “Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten”, In: Kant, Immanuel. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft - Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkampf, 1977 (GMS, BA 52).
  • 13. Kant, Immanuel , “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose”, In: Kant, Immanuel, Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1990.
  • 14. Kant, Immanuel , “Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürger Absicht”, In: Kant, Immanuel, Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik 1. Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkampf, 1977 (AG, A 392).
  • 15. Kant, Immanuel , “On the Common Saying: This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in Practice”, In: KANT, Immanuel Kant, Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1990.
  • 16. Kant, Immanuel , “Über den Gemeinspruch: das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die praxis”, In: Kant, Immanuel. Schriften zur Anthropologie, Geschichtsphilosophie, Politik und Pädagogik 1. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkampf, 1977(ÜG, A, 251).
  • 17. Kant, Immanuel Critique of Practical Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1997.
  • 18. Kant, Immanuel Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964
  • 19. Kant, Immanuel , Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. In: KANT, Immanuel, Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkampf, 1977 (KpV, A 46).
  • 20. Kant, Immanuel Metaphysical Elements of Justice. 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1999).
  • 21. Kelsen, Hans Pure Theory of Law. Berkeley: University of California, 1967.
  • 22. Kirste, Stephan Einführung in die Rechtsphilosophie. Darmstadt: WBG, 2010. Luther auf dem Reichstag zu Worms (1521), (Feb. 05, 2015), avaiable at http://www.luther.de/leben/worms.html.
  • 23. Luther, Martin , “To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation”, In: LUTHER, Marti. Three Treatises. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970.
  • 24. Macpherson, C , B. Macpherson. The Political Theory of Possessiv Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Oxford University, 2011.
  • 25. Nozick, Robert Anarchy, State and Utopia. 2nd ed., New York: Basic Books, 2013
  • 26. Ostrensky, Eunice , “Liberalismo classico”. In: Leonardo Avritzer et al., Dimensoes politicas da justica. Rio de Janeiro: Civilizacao Brasileira, 2013.
  • 27. Paton, H , J. Paton. The categorical imperative: A study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948.
  • 28. Rawls, John , “The justification of Civil Disobedience” In: RAWLS, John. Collected Papers. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1999.
  • 29. Rawls, John A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Belknap, 1999.
  • 30. Rawls, John Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University, 1996.
  • 31. Salgado, Joaquim Carlos A ideia de justica em Kant: seu fundamento na liberdade e na igualdade. 2nd ed. Belo Horizonte: UFMG, 1995.
  • 32. Thomasius, Christian , “Is Heresy a Punishable Crime?” In: Thomasius, Christian. Essays on Church, State and Politics. Indianapolis: Liberty Funds, 2007.
  • 33. Vita, Alvaro de Vita , “Liberalismo contemporaneo”, In: Leonardo Avritzer et al, Dimensoes politicas da justiça. Rio de Janeiro: Civilizacao Brasileira, 2013.
  • 34. von der Pfordten, Dietmar , Kants Rechtsbegriff, Kant-Studien, 98 (2007) 431.
  • 35. Waldron, Jeremy , Kant’s Legal Positivism. Harvard Law Review 109, (1995-1996). 1566.