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Rethinking Schelling’s Philosophy of Nature Through a Process Account of Emergence

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Life, Organisms, and Human Nature

Part of the book series: Studies in German Idealism ((SIGI,volume 22))

Abstract

The paper proposes a novel reading of Schelling’s speculative physics in light of debates concerning the notion of emergence in philosophy of science. We begin by highlighting Schelling’s disruptive potential with regard to the contemporary philosophical landscape, currently polarized over a false dichotomy between reductionist Humeanism and liberal Kantianism. We then argue that a broadly Schellingian approach to nature is unwittingly being revived by a group of scholars promoting a non-mainstream process account of emergence based on the notion of constraint and grounded in far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics. Such an account, we argue, represents an effective theoretical platform to re-read Schelling’s philosophy of nature today. This reading provides a picture of life and mind as emerging out of self-organizing processes that take place through the self-inhibition of nature’s inherent tendency to disorder.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    We owe this idea to a talk by Paul Franks at KU Leuven: “From World-Soul to Universal Organism: Toward an Understanding of Schelling’s Philosophy of Nature.”

  2. 2.

    Though contemporary dispositionalism usually leans toward an Aristotlean-like substance ontology, it has recently been argued that dispositionalism can productively be understood in processual terms (Anjum and Mumford 2018).

  3. 3.

    While the general account of process emergence we present in 3.1 can be extended all the way to quantum mechanics, the more specific ‘work-constraint’ account of 3.2 and 3.3 –which we see as a subset of the more general theory– is tied to thermodynamics, meaning that it remains unclear how that specific account would be relevant for understanding emergence at certain levels, such as the level of quantum mechanics, if at all.

  4. 4.

    “While, in the past, biologists have tended to think of organization as something extra, something added to the elementary variables, the modern theory, based on the logic of communication, regards organization as a restriction or constraint” (Ashby 1962, 257).

  5. 5.

    The striking parallels between Schelling and Deacon may be due to the deep influence of Charles Sanders Peirce on Deacon’s work. Peirce saw himself as pursuing “an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth, and to a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind” (1892, 533; see also Dilworth (2016) and Franks (2015). Though Peirce was also quite critical of German Idealism, and Deacon for his part quite critical of Peirce (particularly of his panpsychist tendencies) it is clear that we find a common thread running through their respective works. (For an introduction to Deacon’s distinctively ‘semiotic’ approach, see: Deacon 2015)

  6. 6.

    Deacon exemplifies this using a simple chemical model that he calls the autogen, which he also considers a plausible origins of life model. For more details see Leijnen et al. (2016) and Deacon (2021).

  7. 7.

    For a further account of Schelling’s understanding of organisms in relation to other options in his era cf. Kabeshkin 2017. While we agree with the categorization thereby provided, we are less convinced by the reading of Schelling as an epistemological pluralist à la John Dupré (1993)

  8. 8.

    There remain many questions concerning the extent of this parallel, and there are certainly some key differences in their respective accounts. We do not deal with this question here, but we deem it to be a question which requires further investigation in subsequent work.

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Gambarotto, A., Nahas, A. (2023). Rethinking Schelling’s Philosophy of Nature Through a Process Account of Emergence. In: Corti, L., Schülein, JG. (eds) Life, Organisms, and Human Nature. Studies in German Idealism, vol 22. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41558-6_3

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