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The Coming of Game Theory

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Abstract

This is a brief historical note on game theory. We cover its historical roots (prior to its formal definition in 1944), and look at its development until the late 1960's.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, Statistics, Computer Science and Applications, University of Bergamo, Via dei Caniana 2, Italy

    Gianfranco Gambarelli

  2. Naval Postgraduate School -- Mathematics Code MA/ON, Naval Postgraduate School, CA, USA

    Guillermo Owen

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  1. Gianfranco Gambarelli
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  2. Guillermo Owen
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Gambarelli, G., Owen, G. The Coming of Game Theory. Theory and Decision 56, 1–18 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-004-5629-3

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