Abstract
The Coase theorem is argued to be incompatible with bargaining set stability due to a tension between the grand coalition and sub-coalitions. We provide a counter-intuitive argument to demonstrate that the Coase theorem may be in complete consonance with bargaining set stability. We establish that an uncertainty concerning the formation of sub-coalitions will explain such compatibility: each agent fears that others may `gang up' against him and this fear forces the agents to negotiate. The grand coalition emerges from the negotiations if each agent uses the principle of equal relative sacrifice to determine the actual allocation. We also establish the rational basis for the choice of the principle of equal relative concession by the negotiating agents. Hence we argue that the Coase theorem will be valid even if there are stable sub-coalitions.
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Gangopadhyay, P. On the coase theorem and coalitional stability: the principle of equal relative concession. Theory and Decision 48, 179–191 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005142606780
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005142606780