Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Bare Particulars and Constituent Ontology

  • Published:
Acta Analytica Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

My general aim in this paper is to shed light on the controversial concept of a bare particular. I do so by arguing that bare particulars are best understood in terms of the individuative work they do within the framework of a realist constituent ontology. I argue that outside such a framework, it is not clear that the notion of a bare particular is either motivated or coherent. This is suggested by reflection on standard objections to bare particulars. However, within the framework of a realist constituent ontology, bare particulars provide for a coherent theory of individuation—one with a potentially significant theoretical price tag, but one that also has advantages over rival theories.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. For recent critical discussion of bare particulars see Bailey (2012), Davis (2003 and 2004), Davis & Brown (2008), Mertz (2001 and 2003), Moreland (2000), Moreland and Pickavance (2003), Pickavance (2009 and Forthcoming), and Sider (2006).

  2. See Garcia (2009), Loux (2006), and Moreland (2013) for a broader discussion of the differences between relational and constituent ontology.

  3. A related issue is the challenge of accounting for the fact (not necessarily the subject) of thick-character. Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra calls the challenge of accounting for thick-character the “Many Over One” problem (2002, pp. 46–49).

  4. Much of the widespread conviction that this is possible has its source in Black (1952).

  5. I discuss nominalist constituent ontology, and, in particular, trope bundle theory, in “Bundle theory’s black box: gap challenges for the bundle theory of substance” (2013), “Tropes and dependency profiles: problems for the nuclear theory of substance” (2013), and (2009).

  6. The notion of an essence discussed here is from Plantinga (1974).

  7. Others such as Gary Rosenkrantz (1993, pp. 77f) call this the distinction between qualitative and non-qualitative properties.

  8. I wish to thank a referee for helpful suggestions as to how (i) and (ii) might be avoided.

  9. Loux (2006, p. 228)

  10. Cf. Bergmann (1967, p. 24) and Wolterstorff (1970, p. 118).

  11. This quotation is from Sellars (1963, p. 282). The logical notation is from Baker (1967, pp. 211–12) and is different from Sellars’s only in style.

  12. These objections are taken, respectively, from their (1994, pp. 48–50) and (1997, pp. 17–20). I use “bare particular” where they have “substratum”.

  13. Alston’s purpose in his (1954) was not to argue for the existence of bare particulars, but to show how Sellars’s objection was based on a misconstrual of bare particulars as well as “a confusion between facts and particulars.”

References

  • Alston, W. (1954). Particulars—bare and qualified. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 15, 253–258.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bailey, A. (2012). No bare particulars. Philosophical Studies, 158, 31–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baker, R. (1967). Particulars: bare, naked, and nude. Noûs, 1, 211–212.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bergmann, G. (1967). Realism: A critique of Brentano and Meinong. Madison, Milwaukee, and London: University of Wisconsin Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Black, M. (1952). The identity of indiscernibles. Mind, 61, 153–164.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davis, R. B. (2003). ‘Partially clad’ bare particulars exposed. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81, 534–548.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davis, R. B. (2004). The brave new bare particularism. Modern Schoolman, 81, 267–273.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davis, R. B., & Brown, D. S. (2008). A puzzle for bare particulars? Axiomathes, 18, 49–65.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Garcia, R. (2009). Nominalist constituent ontologies: A development and critique. Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame.

  • Garcia, R. (2013). Bundle theory’s black box: gap challenges for the bundle theory of substance. Philosophia (in press).

  • Garcia, R. (2013). Tropes and dependency profiles: problems for the nuclear theory of substance. American Philosophical Quarterly (in press).

  • Hoffman, J., & Rosenkrantz, G. (1994). Substance and other categories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hoffman, J., & Rosenkrantz, G. (1997). Substance: Its nature and existence. London and New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loux, M. (1978). Substance and attribute. Dordrecht: Reidel.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Loux, M. (2006). Aristotle’s constituent ontology. In D. Zimmerman (Ed.), Oxford studies in metaphysics (Vol. 2, pp. 207–250). New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mertz, D. W. (2001). Individuation and instance ontology. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79, 45–61.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mertz, D. W. (2003). Against bare particulars: a response to Moreland and Pickavance. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81, 14–20.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moreland, J. P. (2000). Issues and options in individuation. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 60, 31–54.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moreland, J. P. (2013). Exemplification and constituent realism: a clarification and modest defense. Axiomathes, 23, 247–259.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moreland, J. P., & Pickavance, T. (2003). Bare particulars and individuation: reply to Mertz. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 81, 1–13.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pickavance, T. (2009). In defense of ‘partially clad’ bare particulars. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 87, 155–158.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pickavance, T. (Forthcoming). Bare particulars and exemplification. American Philosophical Quarterly.

  • Plantinga, A. (1974). The nature of necessity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2002). Resemblance nominalism: A solution to the problem of universals. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Rosenkrantz, G. (1993). Haecceity: An ontological essay. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Sellars, W. (1963). Science, perception and reality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sider, T. (2006). Bare particulars. Philosophical Perspectives, 20, 387–397.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wolterstorff, N. (1970). Bergmann’s constituent ontology. Noûs, 4, 109–134.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to Peter van Inwagen and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Texas A&M University, YMCA Building 4237 TAMU, College Station, TX, 77843-4237, USA

    Robert K. Garcia

Authors
  1. Robert K. Garcia
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Robert K. Garcia.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Garcia, R.K. Bare Particulars and Constituent Ontology. Acta Anal 29, 149–159 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-013-0208-2

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-013-0208-2

Keywords

Search

Navigation