Abstract
Belief commitment and belief revision are two distinctive characteristics of common sense reasoning which have so far resisted satisfactory formal accounts. Classical logic for instance, cannot accommodate belief revision: new information can only add new theorems. Probability theory, on the other hand, has difficulties in accommodating belief commitment: propositions are believed only to a certain degree which dynamically changes with the acquisition of new information.
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© 1990 Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Geffner, H., Pearl, J. (1990). A Framework for Reasoning with Defaults. In: Kyburg, H.E., Loui, R.P., Carlson, G.N. (eds) Knowledge Representation and Defeasible Reasoning. Studies in Cognitive Systems, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0553-5_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-0553-5_3
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