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The Surprise Examination in Dynamic Epistemic Logic

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Abstract

We examine the paradox of the surprise examination using dynamic epistemic logic. This logic contains means of expressing epistemic facts as well as the effects of learning new facts, and is therefore a natural framework for representing the puzzle. We discuss a number of different interpretations of the puzzle in this context, and show how the failure of principle of success, that states that sentences, when learned, remain to be true and come to be believed, plays a central role in understanding the puzzle.

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  1. Dipartimento di Informatica, University of Turin, Corso Svizzera 185, 10149, Torino, Italy

    J. Gerbrandy

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  1. J. Gerbrandy
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Gerbrandy, J. The Surprise Examination in Dynamic Epistemic Logic. Synthese 155, 21–33 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-005-2211-7

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