Franciscan Studies

EXISTENTIAL IMPORT AND "LATIN AVERROISM" In a recent paper1 we discussed the validity of inferences from universal propositions to particular ones, namely from A to I and from E to O in the Aristotelian Square of Opposition. We had occasion to mention that such inferences fitted in very weU with the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world, since this doctrine ensured that there would always be individuals in each species to function as subjects for such propositions. On the other hand, we suggested, these inferences fitted awkwardly into the creationist metaphysics of St. Thomas, in which there is no necessity at all that any given species have any members in it at any given moment. And this awkwardness becomes clearer when we consider the universal agreement among scholastic logicians that, as Joyce sums it up, "Logic is the science which treats of the conceptual representation of the real order; in other words, which has for its subject matter things as they are represented in our thought."2 So for scholastics , logic and metaphysics are related in such a way that a certain position in one entaüs a certain position in the other. Let us now illustrate the point at issue by taking an A-type proposition which is generally accepted as true: "AU men are rational." If it implies, as it does in the traditional Square, that "Some men are rational ," then if no men existed, the particular proposition would be false thereby involving the falsity of its corresponding universal proposition. For the generally accepted interpretation of an I proposition — SIP — is: "There exists at least one S which is a P." Now it is significant to note that Siger of Brabant, the leader of the thirteenth-century "Averroist"3 movement, explicitly raised the question 1 "Is the Square Back in Opposition ?", Philosophical Studies, (Maynooth 1957)· 2 G. H. Joyce, Principles of Logic, (Longman's, 1908), p. 2; see also P. Coffey, The Science of Logic, (Longman's 1938), vol I, ch. ii passim; and Jacques Maritain, Formal Logic, (Sheed & Ward, 1946), Introd. 8 We use the term "Averroist" in this context only as a matter of convenience. Prof. F. van Steenberghen's Belfast Lectures — see The Philosophical Movement in the Thirteenth Century, (Nelson, 1955), pp. 76—93 — seem to leave little doubt about the falsity of the popular appelation. But see the bibliographical notes he gives and see E. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, (Random House, 1955), pp. 389—90, 719; and F. Copleston, History of Philosophy, (Burns, Oates & W., 1950), vol. ii, pp. 437—441. 127 128GIERYMSKI — SLA TTERY whether man is an animal although there were no men in existence: and his answer was, No.4 In other words the truth of the universal proposition, "Every man is an animal" depends on the existence of men. Yet Siger was in no embarrassment over the truth of such evidently true universal propositions and over the validity of inferring from A to I4a since he accepted the Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the world, a doctrine involving eternally membered species. As Prof. F. van Steenberghen says on this point: "... the question is answered in accordance with radical Aristotelianism, by the affirmation of the eternity of the human species."6 The eminent Professor also teUs us of Siger that: "His philosophical system is dominated by a theory of knowledge that is strictly Aristotelian . . . He bases the absolute value of judgements of the abstract order on the eternity of the world and all the species."6 (our italics.) This coincidence of Aristotelian logic with Aristotelian cosmology furnishes an admirable illustration of the above-mentioned thesis that logic treats of the conceptual representation of the real order — we should add here, "real order as seen by Aristotle." But what about the real order as seen by St. Thomas and by other Christian thinkers ? In opposition to the Aristotelian doctrine of the necessary eternity of the world with its consequent rejection of creation,7 and to Siger's doctrine of the necessary eternal creation, or more correctly emanation 4 "Queritur utrum hec sit vera: homo est animal nullo homine existente. Et videtur quod non, quia si homo...