Abstract
This essay focuses on what patriotism is, as opposed to the value of patriotism. It focuses further on the basic patriotic motive: one acts with this motive if one acts on behalf of one’s country as such. I first argue that pre-theoretically the basic patriotic motive is sufficient to make an act patriotic from a motivational point of view. In particular the agent need not ascribe virtues or achievements to his country nor need he feel towards it the emotions characteristic of love. Why should one ever act on behalf of one’s country as such, if one does not particularly admire it or feel a special affection for it? In answer to this question I offer a further articulation of the basic patriotic motive, invoking a particular understanding of what it is to be the member of a political society. Building on this articulation I then consider how one might characterize a patriotic act, a patriotic person, and the relationship of patriotism and pride.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Rough translation from the Latin: “It is a sweet and proper thing to die for one’s country.” This is line 13, of Ode 2, Book 3 of Horace’s Odes (Horace 1901, p. 84). For a suggested interpretation of Horace’s line, and reference to Wilfrid Owen’s use of the line, see the text, below.
Primoratz (2002b, p. 188) refers to a “political entity.”
Here I allude to the cluster of doctrines that fall under the rubric of “cosmopolitanism.” One sometimes finds in the literature on that subject a preference for “the moral community” over other political societies. Though the quoted phrase appears to conjure a genuinely collective entity, it is not, I think, generally so construed in the cosmopolitan literature.
In these initial sections I respond, to some extent, to Primoratz’s discussion (Primoratz 2002a, pp. 10–11) which itself reflects common positions on patriotism. More recently, Keller, citing Primoratz, accepts that the patriot will “conceive of the beloved country as having certain valuable characteristics” (Keller 2005, p. 574). The common assumption that a patriot is one who loves his country and/or believes it to have important virtues strongly suggests that a patriotic act will in part at least be prompted by love of and/or admiration for one’s country.
The Life of King Henry the Fifth, Act III, Scene 1, line 34 (Shakespeare 1900, p. 33).
Primoratz (2002a, p. 10) urges that the love of a patriot will be a love expressed in action.
Primoratz (2002a, p. 10) prefers to speak of concern in connection with patriotism.
Cf. Nash (1938), in “Kind of an Ode to Duty”: “Oh Duty/Why hast thou not the visage of a sweetie or a cutie?”
Cf. “I am going to use the terms ‘love’ and ‘loyalty’ almost interchangeably” (Keller 2005, p. 567n14).
I thank Primoratz for pointing out the existence and meaning of “in behalf of” in English usage (personal communication, 2008).
I draw on the more detailed discussion in Gilbert (2006), which further develops the account of social groups introduced in Gilbert (1989), attempting to bring out what is important for present purposes. As will emerge, my approach has something in common with that in Ingram (2002, 223–225). We differ in that she draws on Searle’s account of “collective intentionality” (Searle 1990) whereas I draw on my own distinct approach to the pertinent phenomena, and follow out the consequences of that approach. For a critique of Searle, see Gilbert (2007).
See Gilbert (2006), Chapter 8 and elsewhere.
I do not mean to imply that a country cannot fail to recognize a legal status of citizenship.
In the ideal case, all members of some population are parties to all of a particular set of joint commitments some or all of which sustain a set of political institutions.
One of its implications is that the kind of patriotism I discuss embraces but is not restricted to “constitutional patriotism” construed as a patriotism whose focus is a set of political institutions. On constitutional patriotism see e.g., Ingram (2002); she cites as a central reference Habermas (1992).
Compare a commitment to “look after” someone when they are ill. One is obviously required to make sure various basic needs of theirs are fulfilled. It is less obvious that one must cater to their every whim.
This observation has a number of implications some of which are discussed below in the section on patriotism and pride. On the English pronoun “we,” see Gilbert (1989), Chap. 4.
For a more fine-grained discussion, see Gilbert (2003).
See Gilbert (2006).
A wrinkle here is that one may be jointly committed with others, qua persons with feature F, to accept as a body the rule “Do not deliberately give up feature F.” But this need not be the case. For a longer discussion of ways of ceasing to be party to a given joint commitment see Gilbert (2006, Chapter 7).
For discussion of agreements in this context see e.g., Gilbert (2006, Chapter 10).
See e.g., Gilbert (2006, Chapter 7).
Among other things there is a long-standing and well-known debate between “interest theories” and “will theories” in the literature. See e.g., Sreenivasan (2005). I discuss this literature and problems I find in it in my book Rights Reconsidered to be published by Oxford University Press. For some pertinent discussion see Gilbert (2004).
Hart (1955) is one who associates claim-rights and owing.
Feinberg (1970) refers to the right-holder demanding as his what he has a right to.
For some further discussion see Gilbert (2006, Chapter 7). I say more about it in Rights Reconsidered.
For other ways of arguing that the parties to any joint commitment are obligated to one another to conform to it see, e.g., Gilbert (2000).
“Correspondingly:” if we think of demanding as demanding as mine, and rebuking as the “after the fact” version of a demand. I think this is the correct construal of the central narrow sense of “demand” and “rebuke.” See Gilbert (2006), Chapter 1 on different senses of these terms.
See Plato (1974). Though this example may be thought of as a matter of owing the man his weapon, it can easily be thought of in terms of owing an action: the action of returning the weapon. What was implicitly or explicitly agreed by the parties was that the person with whom the weapon was deposited would give it back.
For some interpretations of “owe” the points in this paragraph are not correct. Cf. Oldenquist (2002), p. 35, on gratitude. Unless otherwise stated, I use the interpretation offered in the text above throughout this essay.
Walzer (2002, p. 267), emphasis mine. I do not say that for Walzer a “shared commitment” is equivalent to my “joint commitment.” It is possible that he has no explicit articulation of “shared commitment” in mind.
My discussion of Claire’s case has benefited from conversation with Aaron James.
The quoted phrase is attributed to the British nurse Edith Cavell prior to her execution by the Germans after she admitted helping British servicemen and others to escape from German-occupied land during the First World War. Its broader context is: “… this I would say, standing as I do in view of God and eternity: I realize that patriotism is not enough. I must have no hatred or bitterness towards anyone” (quoted in Gilbert 2004, pp. 202–203).
My discussion of this point was prompted by a query from Primoratz.
I say more about unpatriotic acts below.
See Gilbert (2006) for further discussion.
Spooner (1845).
In Latin: “Mors et fugacem persequitur virum”.
A different perspective, also reflected in Kai’s case, is found in the poem “Dulce et decorum est,” written in the years 1917–1918 by British war poet Wilfrid Owen, who chronicles the horrors of life in the trenches in the First World War and ends with the line partially quoted in its title, which it introduces as “the old Lie” (Owen 1988, p. 50).
See Gilbert (2006, pp. 284f.). for some further discussion.
Walzer (1970, Chapter 4). The quotation in the text below is at p. 98.
It would not be unreasonable to define a “good citizen” in the same way. I think, though, that “good citizen” may often implicitly be defined differently. For instance, this phrase may be defined in terms of actual conformity to laws and so on, rather than by reference to motive. Here I respond to Primoratz (personal communication, 2008).
J. Quincy Adams, letter to his father, quoted in Allison (2005, p. 184). Adams is said to be responding to U.S. Commodore Stephen Decatur’s famous (or infamous) toast in 1816 that begins “Our country…” and includes the words “right or wrong.” I have been unable to find an indubitably accurate quotation of this toast, which is reported differently in different locations that I have checked. It is often quoted as “My country, right or wrong!” but, apart from the substitution of “My” for “Our” this is not clearly correct.
The discussion in this paragraph is indebted to Barry Shreiar.
Paine (2004, p. 3).
Cf. Oldenquist (2002, p. 34), discussing the “loyalty patriot:” “To a loyalist, the thought, ‘P is my country,’ though it counts for something, need not outweigh moral arguments against reprisal or military intervention”.
Rousseau (1983), p. 23 (Book I, Chap. 6, “On the Social Compact”).
The quotation is from Hamlet, Act I, Scene 4, line 90 (Shakespeare 1998, p. 84). The speaker is Marcellus. Hamlet has the same sense of things.
References
Allison, Robert J. 2005. Stephen Decatur: American naval hero, 1779–1820. Boston: University of Massachusetts Press.
Broome, John. 1992. Are intentions reasons? And how should we cope with incommensurable values? In Practical rationality and preference: Essays for David Gauthier, ed. C.W. Morris, and A. Ripstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Feinberg, Joel. 1970. The nature and value of rights. Journal of Value Inquiry 4: 243–257.
Gilbert, Margaret. 1989. On social facts. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Gilbert, Margaret. 1996. Living together: Rationality, sociality, and obligation. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Gilbert, Margaret. 1997. Group wrongs and guilt feelings. The Journal of Ethics 1: 65–84.
Gilbert, Margaret. 2000. Sociality and responsibility: New essays in plural subject theory. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
Gilbert, Margaret. 2003. The structure of the social atom. In Socializing Metaphysics, ed. F. Schmitt, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 39–64.
Gilbert, Margaret. 2004. Scanlon on promissory obligation: The problem of promisees’ rights. The Journal of Philosophy 101: 83–109.
Gilbert, Margaret. 2006. A theory of political obligation: Membership, commitment, and the bonds of society. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Gilbert, Margaret. 2007. Searle on collective intentions. In Intentional acts and institutional facts: Essays on John Searle’s social ontology, ed. Savas Tsohatzidis. Dordrecht: Springer.
Gilbert, Martin. 2004. The first world war: A complete history. New York: Macmillan.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1992. Citizenship and national identity: Some reflections on the future of Europe. Praxis International 12: 1–19.
Hart, H.L.A. 1955. Are there any natural rights? The Philosophical Review 64: 175–191.
Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus). 1901. Odes and epodes. Boston and Chicago: Allyn and Bacon.
Ingram, Attracta. 2002. Constitutional patriotism. In Patriotism ed. Igor Primoratz, Amherst-Humanities Books, 217–232.
Keller, Simon. 2005. Patriotism as bad faith. Ethics 115: 563–592.
Lewis, David K. 1969. Convention: A philosophical study. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Nash, Ogden. 1938. I’m a stranger here myself. New York: Little Brown and Co.
Oldenquist, Andrew. 2002. Loyalties. In Patriotism ed. Igor Primoratz, Amherst: Humanities Books, 26–42.
Owen, Wilfred. 1988. Dulce et decorum est. In Wilfrid Owen Selected Poetry and Prose. In ed. Jennifer Breen, New York: Routledge, 50.
Paine, Thomas. 2004. The American crisis. Kessinger Publications.
Plato. 1974. Republic (trans: Grube, G.M.E.). Indianapolis: Hackett.
Plato. 1978. Crito. In The collected dialogues of Plato, ed. E. Hamilton, and H. Cairns. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Primoratz, Igor. 2002a. Introduction. In Patriotism ed. Igor Primoratz, Amherst: Humanities Books, 9–24.
Primoratz, Igor. 2002b. Patriotism: Morally allowed, required, or valuable? In ed. Igor Primoratz, 187–200.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1983. The social contract and discourses (trans: Cress, D.A.). Indianapolis: Hackett.
Searle, John. 1990. Collective intentions and actions. In Intentions and communication, ed. P.R. Cohen, J. Morgan, and M.E. Pollack. Cambridge: MIT Press, 401–415.
Shakespeare, William. 1998. Hamlet. New York: Oxford University Press.
Shakespeare, William. 1900. The life of King Henry the Fifth. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Spooner, Lysander. 1845. The unconstitutionality of slavery. Boston: Bela Marsh.
Sreenivasan, Gopal. 2005. A hybrid theory of claim rights. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 25: 257–274.
Verbeek, Bruno. 2008. Rational self-commitment. In Rationality and commitment, ed. Fabienne Peter, and Hans-Bernard Schmid. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Walzer, Michael. 1970. Obligations: Essays on disobedience, war, and citizenship. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Walzer, Michael. 2002. Civility and civic virtue in contemporary America. In Patriotism ed. Igor Primoratz, Amherst: Humanities Books, 259–272.
Acknowledgments
Warm thanks to Cruz Cervantes, Angela Conyers, Mark Fiocco, Cara Gillis, Sean Greenberg, Casey Hall, Elizabeth Hirst, Aaron James, Nicholas Jolley, David Malament and Alice Silverberg for discussion, to Angelo Corlett Simon Keller and Barry Shreiar for written comments on a draft of the essay, and to Chad Kidd for research assistance. Thanks also to Igor Primoratz for his invitation to contribute to this issue of The Journal of Ethics, and for helpful comments on a late draft. This is the first time I have approached the rich topic of patriotism. I have focused on sketching a perspective that is suggested by my prior work on the related topics of social groups in general, political obligation, and collective moral responsibility.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Gilbert, M. Pro Patria: An Essay on Patriotism. J Ethics 13, 319–346 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9062-2
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10892-009-9062-2