Skip to main content
Log in

Rich addiction

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Subjectivity Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Examining the author’s own experiences of narcotics addiction reveals certain aspects of the addicted mentality that have strong ethical valence. In general, this shows that addiction is not a state fundamentally characterized by lack. The rudiments of this position are found in some contemporary philosophy of addiction; also, it is contrasted with a common widely held mistaken view. Addiction should instead be understood in continuity with and as illuminating the nature of human personhood and subjectivity. Under a phenomenology specific to the author’s experience, addiction appears as a mode of experience that has an unmanageable overflow of narratives created as discourses concerning people, events, thoughts, and feelings; narratives embodied in assemblages of objects; and narratives appearing as mental images. These considerations suggest that pre-reflective connection to the world can be profoundly illuminative but also can isolate is from the world and, further, that our ethical values form from within our lives and not as an artificial addition. Our historical, narrative self-understanding has existential and moral import. Thus, addiction by its extremity exemplifies the ceaseless ethical activity of personhood.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Data availability

No data or code is involved in this paper.

Notes

  1. In this paper, I use “ethics” and “moral philosophy” interchangeably (although I prefer the latter term), and I likewise especially use “moral” and “ethical” interchangeably.

  2. For this reason, my approach will differ as well from such phenomenologucal approaces to addiction as those of Schalow (2017) and Westin (2020).

  3. Here, I understand ‘intersubjective’ as denoting human relations from the point of view of constitutive subjectivity and ‘interpersonal’ as denoting human relations among agents in the widest sense of the many affordances their faculties allow in dyadic and social contrexts.

References

  • Aho, K. 2019. Notes From a Heart Attack: a Phenomenology of an Altered Body. In Phenomenology of the Broken Body, ed. E. Dahl, C. Falke, and T.E. Eriksen, 188–201. London: Routledge.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Ainslie, G. 2014. Intertemporal Bargaining in Addiction. In Alternative Models of Addiction, ed. H. Pikard, S.H. Ahmed, and B. Foddy, 12–16. Lausanne: Frontiers Media.

    Google Scholar 

  • Appiah, K.A. 2020. The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen. New York: Norton.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baker, R. 2022. On Moral Revolutions. In New Perspectives on Moral Change: Anthropologists and Philosophers Engage with Transformations of Life Worlds, ed. C. Eriksen and N. Hämäläinen. New York: Berghahn.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baker, R. 2019. The Structure of Moral Revolutions: Studies of Changes in the Morality of Abortion, Death, and the Bioethics Revolution. Cambridge: The MIT Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bateson, G. 1972. Steps to an Ecology of Mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Beran, O.J. 2019. Addiction as Degradation of life. Ethics and Medicine 35 (3): 170–190.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burdman, F. 2022. A Pluralistic Account of Degrees of Control in Addiction. Philosophical Studies 179: 197–221. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01656-7.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burgos, M. 2018. An Introduction to Personalism. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Butlin, P., and D. Papineau. 2016. Normal and Addictive Desires. In Addiction and Choice: Rethinking the Relationship, ed. N. Heather and G. Sega, 99–115. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Callard, A. 2018. Aspiration: The Agency of Becoming. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Callinicos, A. 2004. Making History: Agency, Structure, and Change in Social Theory. Leiden: Brill.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Carr, D. 2014. Experience and History: Phenomenological Perspectives on the Historical World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Charland, L. 2022. Cynthia’s Dilemma: Consenting to Heroin Prescription. American Journal of Bioethics 2 (2): 37–47. https://doi.org/10.1162/152651602317533686.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cuypers, S. 2000. Autonomy Beyond Voluntarism: In Defense of Hierarchy. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2): 225–256. https://doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2000.10717532.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dill, B., and R. Holton. 2014. The Addict in Us All. In Alternative Models of Addiction, ed. H. Pikard, S.H. Ahmed, and B. Foddy, 28–47. Lausanne: Frontiers Media.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elgabsi, N., and B. Gilbert. 2020. On Some Moral Implications of Linguistic Narrativism Theory. De Ethica: A Journal of Philosophical, Theological and Applied Ethics 6 (1): 75–91. https://doi.org/10.3384/de-ethica.2001-8819.206175

  • Escogotado, A. 1999. A Brief History of Drugs: From the Stone Age to the Stoned Age. Rochester, VT: Park Street Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Duff, C. 2016. Atmospheres of Recovery: Assemblages of health. Environment and Planning 48 (1): 58–74. https://doi.org/10.1177/0308518X15603222.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Evans, J. 2017. The Art of Losing Control: A Philosopher’s Search for Ecstatic Experience. Edinburgh: Canongate.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flanagan, O. 2020. The Disunity of Addictive Cravings. Philosophy, Psychiatry & Psychology 27 (3): 243–246. https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.2020.0030.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Flanagan, O. 2014. The Shame of Addiction. In Alternative Models of Addiction, ed. H. Pikard, S.H. Ahmed, and B. Foddy, 142–152. Lausanne: Frontiers Media.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flanagan, O. 2011. What is it Like to be an Addict? In Addiction and Responsibility, ed. G. Graham, 269–292. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Foddy, B., and J. Savulescu. 2010. A Liberal Account of Addiction. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 17 (1): 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1353/ppp.0.0282.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt, H. 1971. Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1): 5–20. https://doi.org/10.2307/2024717.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Frankfurt, H. 1987. Identification and Wholeheartedness. In Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. F. Schoeman, 27–45. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fraser, S., D. Moore, and H. Keane. 2014. Habits: Rethinking Addiction. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gilbert, B. 2019. A Personalist Philosophy of History. London: Routledge.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hämäläinen, N. 2019. Descriptive Ethics: What Does Moral Philosophy Know About Morality? London: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hart, C. 2019. Drug Use for Grownups: Chasing Liberty in the Land of Fear. London: Penguin.

    Google Scholar 

  • Law, J. 2011. Collateral Realities. In The Politics of Knowledge, ed. P. Baert and F. Rubio, 156–178. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Levy, N. 2019. Addiction: The Belief Oscillation Hypothesis. In The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of Addiction, ed. N. Levy, H. Pickard, and S. Ahmed, 54–62. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis, M.D. 2012. Memoirs of an Addicted Brain: A Neuroscientist Examines His Former Life on Drugs. New York: Public Affairs.

    Google Scholar 

  • LoLordo, A. 2019. Persons: a history. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

  • Luft, S. 2007. The Subjectivity of Effective History and the Suppressed Husserlian Elements in Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics. Idealistic Studies 37 (3): 219–254. https://doi.org/10.5840/idstudies200737315.

  • Maté, G. 2010. In the Realm of Hungry Ghosts: Close Encounters With Addiction. Berkeley: North Atlantic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • McConnell, D. 2016. Narrative Self-constitution and Addiction. American Philosophy Quarterly 53 (3): 307–322.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pikard, H. 2010. Addiction and the Self. Noûs 55 (4): 737–761. https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12328.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pikard, H., S.H. Ahmed, and B. Foddy. 2015. Alternative Models of Addiction. In Alternative Models of Addiction, ed. H. Pikard, S.H. Ahmed, and B. Foddy, 2. Lausanne: Frontiers Media.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Pober, J.M. 2015. Addiction is Not a Natural Kind. In Alternative Models of Addiction, ed. H. Pikard, S.H. Ahmed, and B. Foddy, 114–124. Lausanne: Frontiers Media.

    Google Scholar 

  • Radoilska, L. 2013. Addiction and Weakness of Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Ricoeur, P. 1984. Time and Narrative, vol. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schalow, F. 2017. Toward a Phenomenology of Addiction: Embodiment, Technology, Transcendence. Cham: Springer.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Spingsted, E. 2005. Beyond the Personal: Weil’s critique of Maritain. The Harvard Theological Review 98 (2): 209–218. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0017816005000933.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Westhaver, R. 2011. “A kind of sorting out”: Crystal Methamphetamine, Gay Men, and Health Promotion. Science, Technology & Human Values 36 (2): 160–189. https://doi.org/10.1177/0162243910366.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vandermeuse, R. 2011. Being wholesome: The paradox of methamphetamine addiction and recovery—A hermeneutical phenomenological interpretation within an interdisciplinary, transmethodological study. Qualitative Social Work 11 (3): 299–318. https://doi.org/10.1177/1473325011401470.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weinberg, D. 2011. Sociological Perspectives on Addiction. Sociology Compass 5 (4): 298–310. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9020.2011.00363.x.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Westin, A. 2020. An Existential Phenomenology of Addiction. London: Bloomsbury.

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Funding

The author did not receive funding from any organization for this work.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Bennett Gilbert.

Ethics declarations

Competing interests

There are no financial or non-financial interests that are directly or indirectly related to this work, nor are there any potential conflicts of interest, nor does the author have any competing interests.

Ethical approval

No ethics approval has been required.

Additional information

For N. T. B.

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Rights and permissions

Springer Nature or its licensor (e.g. a society or other partner) holds exclusive rights to this article under a publishing agreement with the author(s) or other rightsholder(s); author self-archiving of the accepted manuscript version of this article is solely governed by the terms of such publishing agreement and applicable law.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Gilbert, B. Rich addiction. Subjectivity (2024). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41286-024-00179-w

Download citation

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/s41286-024-00179-w

Keywords

Navigation