Relativism and the Social-constructivist Paradigm
- Relativism and the Social Constructivist Paradigm
The central thesis of this paper is that most versions of epistemological relativism and constructivism fall into two categories which I call “noncontroversial” versus “controversial.” The former holds that beliefs about reality are constructed by the mind and are relative to various frameworks: history, culture, and individual circumstances. Controversial constructivist relativism holds, by contrast, that truth itself is constructed by the mind and is relative to various frameworks including those Kuhn (1970) calls “paradigms.” Controversial constructivist relativism tends to exert a detrimental influence on psychoanalysis by undermining the search for truth in both theory and clinical practice. Arguments are presented to show that controversial constructivist relativism (CCR) is untenable whereas noncontroversial constructivist relativism (NCR) is trivial in the sense that nobody disputes it. Hoffman’s social-constructivist paradigm (endorsed by Gill) is untenable to the extent that it espouses CCR. Although both Hoffman and Gill explicitly reject CCR in some of their statements, other statements appear to embrace CCR. They can resolve this logical inconsistency by retracting those statements that endorse CCR but at the cost of rendering the social-constructivist paradigm epistemologically trivial. These same arguments apply to the issue of relativism in hermeneutics and postmodernism.
psychoanalysis, science, social constructivism, epistemology, fact, reality, empirical, validation, hermeneutics, postmodernism
The seventy-fifth anniversary issue of the International Journal of Psychoanalysis is devoted to the question “What is a psychoanalytic fact?” The editor, David Tuckett, says that
Psychoanalysis today, to judge by what we know of both theory and practice, is in a state of considerable ferment. We have schools of analysis which appear to be entirely at odds with one another. We have extreme forms of relativism. . . . After seventy-five years it is time not only to review our methodology for assessing our truths, but also to develop approaches that will make it possible to be open to new ideas while also being able to evaluate their usefulness by reasoned argument. The alternative is the Tower of Babel. . . . Nonetheless, I assert that by and large our standards of observation, of clarifying the distinction between observation and conceptualization, and our standards of discussing and debating our observations are extraordinarily low: and they have received far too little attention
(1994, 865).
Although many of the authors writing in this anniversary issue subscribe to standard views of science, some endorse a relativist epistemology. For example, Ornstein and Ornstein assert “that psychoanalytic clinical facts are jointly created by patient and analyst and are to a great degree dependent on the analyst’s mode of observation and theory” (1994, 977). This follows from what [End Page 37] they call “a slowly developing post-positivist climate in psychoanalysis.” I believe that the pervasive influence of relativist thinking in psychoanalysis may have contributed to the “extraordinarily low” standards of discussion underscored by Tuckett above. By denying the existence of truth, controversial constructivist relativism undermines the search for consensus achieved through scientific debate. Insufficient concern for theory validation is one of the most often voiced criticisms of psychoanalysis (see Edelson 1984).
The harmful effects of relativist epistemology on clinical practice are not as easy to ascertain because those who explicitly espouse controversial constructivist relativism reject its logical consequences—namely, that “anything goes.” They tend to conflate controversial and noncontroversial versions of constructivist relativism. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to infer that such clinicians are more apt to neglect the exploration of transference distortion in the therapeutic process. As we shall see later on when Hoffman’s ideas are discussed in more detail, relativists tend to deny the possibility of distortion in the transference or to view it as purely a matter of emphasis. The denial of distortion is a consequence of the relativist notion that each individual has his or her own “constructed” reality with its own truth. The exploration of transference distortion is central to more traditional views of the therapeutic process.
Hoffman and Gill have proposed new and interesting ideas for therapeutic practice, none of which relies on relativist epistemology. They urge analysts to be less dogmatic and arrogant in assuming that they have privileged access to the truth about what transpires in the therapeutic relationship and...
