Abstract
A central debate in philosophy of action concerns whether agential knowledge, the knowledge agents characteristically have of their own actions, is inferential. While inferentialists like Sarah Paul hold that it is inferential, others like Lucy O’Brien and Kieran Setiya argue that it is not. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for the view that agential knowledge is non-inferential, by posing a dilemma for inferentialists: on the first horn, inferentialism is committed to holding that agents have only alienated knowledge of their own actions; on the second horn, inferentialism is caught in a vicious regress. Neither option is attractive, so inferentialism should be rejected.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
Better: “reintroduced”, as the notion appears already in the writings of Avicenna, Maimonides, and Aquinas. The literature on agential knowledge is extensive. See Schwenkler (2012) for a helpful review. Unless otherwise noted, when I speak of ‘actions’ I mean ‘intentional actions’. I use the term ‘agential knowledge’ where many others use ‘practical knowledge’, because I think there are forms of practical knowledge that do not concern an agent’s actions (Piñeros Glasscock ms.). However, I shall not argue for this point in the paper, and the reader is free to substitute their preferred label.
Anscombe goes on to argue that agential knowledge is non-observational because it is “practical”, insofar as it is “the cause of what it understands” (p. 87). See Moran (2004) on the relation between the two.
On the difference, see Anscombe ([1957] 1963).
Cognitivists include Velleman (2001), Marušić and Schwenkler (2018), and Setiya (2007, 2008), though in his latest work Setiya states the view in terms of increases in epistemic confidence when one acts intentionally. Weaker versions of cognitivism hold that having an intention entails having a belief, but take intentions to be a separate state (see e.g. Clark (2020) for a recent defense of such a view). Setiya’s argument against inferentialism below (pp. 6–7) shows why even these weaker views sit uneasy with inferentialism.
Here, I am in agreement with Paul (2009a), who argues that Grice’s (1971) cognitivist inferentialism is an unstable position, lacking the resources to explain how we could ever have practical knowledge, as our beliefs about our actions “would be neither based on evidence nor self-fulfilling” (p. 20).
Other prominent inferentialists include Grice (1971), on whose work Paul is building, and O'Shaughnessy (1980, p. 515, 2003, p. 349). On the other hand, a view like Marušić and Schwenkler’s (2018) (and arguably Anscombe’s), on which agential knowledge is gained on the basis of a practical inference is not called into question by my argument.
In her (2012), Paul presents an account of the mechanism by which we come to know our intentions on the basis of our decisions. This view might explain why knowledge of our intentions is spontaneous. Even if it does, I shall argue that the spontaneity is not transferred to knowledge of our actions on an inferential account.
At least if Φ is of the right type (e.g. if you’re in the middle of a street, and you form the intention to walk, you will be thereby engaged in the process of walking (note the progressive aspect on the formulation)). As Paul notes (p. 16) further complications arise when considering telic action descriptions, but I ignore these complications since they are irrelevant to the issue at hand.
This reply can also serve as the basis to answer O’Brien’s (2007) objection that “it does not seem to me that I know I am raising my arm as a result of inferring that I am from my knowing that I intend to raise my arm” (p. 177). The unconscious shape that inferences can take might make knowledge of our actions seem immediate without their actually being so.
It is strong only against a view like Grice’s (1971), who upheld both inferentialism and cognitivist principles.
For simplicity, I omit the qualification about circumstances. Let’s assume they are met throughout.
This seems to be the best way to ensure that the belief in the conditional claim is not dependent on belief in execution. The two horns of the dilemma at a more general level are as follows: either (a) belief in the conditional claim is not dependent on belief in the execution or (b) it is so dependent. (a) leads to alienated knowledge, and (b) to a regress (assuming inferentialism).
This point bears on an objection raised to me by Sarah Paul: Can’t the agent simply have it as a background assumption that she won’t change her mind (as one might have it as a background assumption that there will be sufficient oxygen for the fire to keep burning)? I answer that she cannot: the agent would at least have to assume the stronger claim that her mind is set on doing what she intends, i.e. that she will execute her action (given the considerations in n14). More importantly, the same worry would arise for such a background assumption: on what basis would the agent assume (or be warranted in assuming) that she won’t change her mind? Given that she is capable of changing it, she cannot from the agential standpoint assume that her intention settles that she will not.
My understanding of bad faith is indebted to Moran’s (2001) now classic work on the topic.
This also addresses another worry. Might it be that Moira’s case is alienated because she needs to consciously rely on external factors to figure out what she intends, rather than (as I claim) because she takes herself to have no further say about what to do given her previously formed intentions? The problem is that the proposed explanation overreaches: an agent who relies on her calendar to remember what she plans to do (as most of us do), need not have alienated knowledge, despite her conscious awareness of relying on the calendar. Her knowledge won’t be alienated if she takes the decision to still be up to her. Thanks to Kenny Easwaran and Sergio Tenenbaum for pushing me to address this problem.
I thank an anonymous referee for raising this objection and suggesting the appeal to unconscious processes to strengthen it.
Thus, for instance, we could endorse a view like Setiya’s (2011), on which knowledge of our intentions is posterior to knowledge of our actions. However, the argument is consistent with a view that gives no priority to either knowledge, and takes them as equally basic.
I say “at a minimum” because even infinitists recognize forms of epistemic regress that are vicious. Hence, the inferentialist would also have to show that the present regress is among the non-vicious ones.
Peter Klein has been the foremost defender of the view among contemporary epistemologists. See Klein (2011) for a helpful survey of the literature.
This paper is based on work from my dissertation, and was presented at the 2020 Eastern Session of the APA. I thank Randolph Clarke, Kenny Easwaran, Blakely Phillips, and Paul Silva for their questions, and especially Eugene Chislenko for his excellent comments and insightful conversation on the occasion. I also thank two anonymous referees for their comments, as well as David Charles, Jennifer Daigle, Stephen Darwall, Daniel Greco, Michael Della Rocca, Reier Helle, Daniel Moerner, Allison Piñeros Glasscock, and Jason Stanley for discussion. Finally, I owe special thanks to Sarah Buss, Sarah Paul, Sergio Tenenbaum, and Gideon Yaffe for discussion and written comments on earlier drafts. Research on this project was supported by the University of Toronto-Mississauga Postdoctoral Fellowship Award Program, sponsored by their Philosophy Department and the UTM Office of the Vice-Principal, Research.
References
Anscombe, G. E. M. ([1957] 1963). Intention (2nd ed.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Boghossian, P. (2014). What is inference? Philosophical Studies, 169(1), 1–18.
Clark, P. (2020). Intentions, intending, and belief: Noninferential weak cognitivism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12308.
Davidson, D. (2001). Intending. In Essays on actions and events (pp. 83–102). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Frankfurt, H. G. (1978). The problem of action. American Philosophical Quarterly, 15(2), 157–162.
Grice, H. P. (1971). Intention and uncertainty. Proceedings of the British Academy, 57, 263–279.
Harman, G. (1986a). Change in view (Vol. 1). Cambridge: MIT Press.
Harman, G. (1986b). Willing and intending. In R. E. Grandy & R. Warner (Eds.), Philosophical grounds of rationality (pp. 363–380). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harman, G. (1997). Practical reasoning. Review of Metaphysics, 29(3), 431–463.
Hornsby, J. (2016). Intending, knowing how, infinitives. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 46(1), 1–17.
Klein, P. D. (2011). Infinitism. In S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (Eds.), Routledge companion to epistemology (pp. 245–256). Abingdon: Routledge.
Marušić, B. (2015). Evidence and agency: Norms of belief for promising and resolving. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marušić, B., & Schwenkler, J. (2018). Intending is believing: A defense of strong cognitivism. Analytic Philosophy, 59(3), 309–340.
Moran, R. (2001). Authority and estrangement: An essay on self-knowledge. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Moran, R. (2004). Anscombe on ‘practical knowledge’. In J. Hyman & H. Steward (Eds.), Royal institute of philosophy supplement (Vol. 55, pp. 43–68). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
O’Brien, L. (2007). Self-knowing agents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O’Shaughnessy, B. (1980). The will (Vol. 2). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
O’Shaughnessy, B. (2003). The epistemology of physical action. In J. Roessler & N. Eilan (Eds.), Agency and self-awareness: Issues in philosophy and psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Paul, S. K. (2009a). How we know what we’re doing. Philosophers’ Imprint, 9(11), 1–24.
Paul, S. K. (2009b). Intention, belief, and wishful thinking: Setiya on “practical knowledge”. Ethics, 119(3), 546–557.
Paul, S. K. (2012). How we know what we intend. Philosophical Studies, 161(2), 327–346.
Piñeros Glasscock, J. S. (ms.). Authoritative knowledge.
Schwenkler, J. (2012). Non‐observational knowledge of action. Philosophy Compass, 7(10), 731–740.
Setiya, K. (2007). Reasons without rationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Setiya, K. (2008). Practical knowledge. Ethics, 118(3), 388–409.
Setiya, K. (2009). Practical knowledge revisited. Ethics, 120(1), 128–137.
Setiya, K. (2011). Knowledge of intention. In A. Ford, J. Hornsby, & F. Stoutland (Eds.), Essays on anscombe’s intention (pp. 170–197). Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Thompson, M. (2008). Life and action. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Velleman, J. D. (2001). Practical reflection: David Hume series. Stanford: CSLI Publications.
Velleman, J. D. (2014). What Good is a will. In M. Vargas & G. Yaffe (Eds.), Rational and social agency: The philosophy of Michael Bratman (pp. 83–103). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wright, C. (2014). Comment on Paul Boghossian, “What is inference”. Philosophical Studies, 169(1), 27–37.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Additional information
Publisher's Note
Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Piñeros Glasscock, J.S. Alienation or regress: on the non-inferential character of agential knowledge. Philos Stud 178, 1757–1768 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01508-w
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01508-w