Abstract
The most controversial condition that the AGM theory of rational belief change places on belief contraction is the recovery condition. The condition is controversial because of a series of putative counterexamples due (separately) to I. Levi and S. O. Hansson. In this paper we show that the conflicts that Levi and Hansson arrange between AGM contraction and our intuitions about how to give up beliefs are merely apparent. We argue that these conflicts disappear once we attend more closely to the identification of the beliefs contracted away in each counterexample case. Since, on our view, speakers" belief contraction intentions are often more complicated than they may first appear, we are led to develop apparatus for thinking about the communication and identification of those intentions. Our argument refocuses attention on the difficult question of how to apply the AGM theory to particular cases.
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Glaister, S.M. Recovery Recovered. Journal of Philosophical Logic 29, 171–206 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004781319263
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1004781319263